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ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION:




The role of financial liability in imposing a penalty on directors
of corporations for breaching a legal duty has become opaque.'
The rationale for financial liability arising from board service has
not been clearly articulated, in that there is no social consensus or
academic theory for imposing financial liability.2 The legal codes
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' See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1253 (1999) (arguing that the threat of liability is not
necessarily the primary motivating factor in giving corporate actors incentives to
engage in good conduct).
2 The work contributed by Joseph Bishop reflected the confidence of a prior
academic generation in the propriety of liability being imposed on board
members who breached a duty to a corporation. See GEORGE THOMAS
WASHINGTON & JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE: BUSINESS, LEGAL, AND TAX ASPECTS OF REIMBURSEMENT FOR
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governing director liability-i.e., rules that qualify its scope and
innovate forms of exoneration-have created escape valves to
avoid the imposition of liability and to permit advance protection
against liability. 3 Thus, imposing liability as a way to express
corporate norms has become blurred.
Corporations may minimize liability by putting in place
sweeping protections for directors, rather than parceling out
exoneration through a case-by-case, norm-sensitive review of
conduct.4 There is a decreasing likelihood that directors will face
a financial loss as a result of the transactional or substantive costs
created by their breach of duty.5 Yet, sufficient exposure remains
to make directors aware of the risks of, and forms of protection
from, financial liability arising from board service.6 Consequently,
PERSONAL LIABILITY 99-100 (1963). But, academic theory has relaxed its
assumptions about the need for financial liability as a mechanism of corporate
accountability. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1253 (arguing that in addition to
the "prospect of financial gain," corporate accountability is achieved through the
operation of three types of social norms: "behavioral patterns, practices, and
obligational norms").
3 See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.58 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-814(f)
(Michie 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1991 & Supp. 1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.0850(7) (1993 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
4.1(G) (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1999) (providing that any indemnification allowed by the state code shall not be
deemed exclusive of other sources of indemnification). See also Mae Kuykendall,
Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting the Exoneration of
Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Straining the Framework of Corporate
Law, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 443, 467-81 (1998).
4 Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 499-501, 507-12.
See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1012 (1997) (stating that "damage liability
is extremely rare"). See also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1266-67 (minimizing the
threat of liability as a factor in achieving higher standards of director and officer
conduct).
6 See Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Directors and Liability, 18 ALA. L.
REv. 417, 417 (1996) (emphasizing the unpredictable nature of director and
officer exposure to liability). See also EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA
ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND
LIABILITIES, at v (1984 & Supp. 1999) (stating that "[1]itigation against officers
and directors of corporations is commonplace, and possible exposure to
substantial liability under state and federal law is of grave concern to people
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the art of maximizing protections for directors, justifying the
payment of indemnification and reducing the total legal exposure
of directors to financial liability is part of the recommended arsenal
of any lawyer practicing corporate law.7
Because reducing the risk of liability for directors benefits
individuals who help make corporate policy-i.e., corporate
lawyers-it is tempting to view the evolving treatment of director
liability in state corporate codes as arising from forms of rent-
seeking.8 That is, the interests of corporate directors and the
serving in those positions").
I JOHN F. OLSON AND JOSIAH 0. HATCH, III, DIRECTOR & OFFICER
LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, at xi (1991 & Supp. 1998).
As decisions by corporate managers must be made on matters of great
complexity, and under the substantial time pressures of our fast-moving
world of the 1990s, directors and officers frequently turn to counsel for
advice as to not only what their obligations are, but how they can be
protected against the possibility that someone will claim that they have
made an erroneous decision or failed to take an action that should have
been taken.
Id. See generally E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a
Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus.
LAW. 399 (1987) (characterizing exculpation, indemnification and insurance as
part of a sound approach to protecting directors from liability).
8 See HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 107 (1998)
(stating that "legislation is the result of a rent-seeking process in which
legislation is 'sold' by legislators and 'bought' by the highest bidders" and that
"[t]he political activity of interest groups ... is referred to as rent seeking, where
the excessive ... profits earned by interest groups as a result of their political
activity are referred to as rents") (emphasis added). Rent-seeking is a term
mainly used to convey that there are socially wasteful uses of resources by firms
that choose to lobby for state policies that cushion them from competition. See
Warren J. Samuels & Nicholas Mercuro, A Critique of Rent-Seeking Theory, in
NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE ANALYSIS OF RENT-SEEKING AND
DuP ACTivrrIES 56-57 (David C. Colander ed., 1984) (reviewing the principal
definitions of rent-seeking); TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY,
at ix (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). Because the term is used in a
general manner to mean "the waste of resources in the pursuit of altering legal
rights," see Samuels & Mercuro, supra, at 56, the term applies to the activities
that create state-sanctioned protocols for transferring wealth to directors and their
lawyers.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
lawyers who help to write corporate law9 have been advanced by
amendments to provisions of state corporate codes concerning
treatment of director liability. Nonetheless, an impulsively-formed
negative view of this law-making, which has reduced the role of
liability, runs the risk of unduly simplifying the model by which
one accounts for the relatively complex social and economic
arrangements relating to the responsibility and accountability of
boards of directors. While it readily may be demonstrated that self-
interested arguments receive more than their fair share of respect
in the policy environment of code-making,' ° it does not necessari-
ly follow that the social product-i.e., amendments to provisions
concerning director liability-is a mere expression of rank self-
interest. The actual degree, extent, and visibility of director
The initial status quo of director liability was influenced by a view of the
corporation as an entity with a limited legal capacity to award indemnification
to directors. See New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47
(Sup. Ct. 1939). Under a strict interpretation of rent-seeking as waste, the best
solution would have been to allow market forces to find a solution, and thus,
eliminate any opportunity for that waste-i.e., the making and enforcing of
contracts, as with insurance, would efficiently spread the risks of loss among the
parties. The teaching of scholars who have studied rent-seeking theory is that
corporations should avoid spending resources on government intervention to alter
a bundle of rights and obligations that are part of the status quo of an activity.
James M. Buchanan, Before Public Choice, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE THEORY
OF ANARCHY 36-37 (Gordon Tullock ed., 1972). The historical changes in the
rules governing director liability and the labored form of the statutes have
arguably been a process of altering rights that diverts resources to a wasteful use.
9 Payments by corporate lawyers to lobbyists in an effort to reduce the
exposure of directors to financial liability is classic rent-seeking because these
payments to lobbyists take resources from purchasing productive investments.
See Samuels & Mercuro, supra note 8, at 63 (explaining that rent-seeking theory
criticizes efforts to change rights as wasteful). In addition, lawyers are creating
rents for themselves by maintaining a role in the universe of director liability that
has no affect on the amount of indemnification provided directors in relation to
the misconduct. See TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra
note 8, at ix.
10 See, e.g., Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 453-54, 502-05 (discussing the
corporate process of interest group representation in law-making).
" See, e.g., Samuels & Mercuro, supra note 8, at 61 (explaining that
defining a commodity in terms of societal values and selectiveness of identifying
an activity as rent-seeking is complex).
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exposure to liability is determined by a complex mixture of factors,
including: (1) contract; (2) market pressures; (3) organizational
environments and culture; (4) code-mandates requiring protection
from liability or limiting it; (5) social adaptation to changes in the
nature of the board undertaking; and (6) reader strategies in
addressing the legal texts involved.
In this Article, I examine alternative ways of explaining the
format of the regulatory treatment of director liability. In so doing,
I take a relatively agnostic approach, looking for a model that is a
good fit for the statutory facts presented by the codes, as imple-
mented in practice. Part I of the Article provides a brief overview
of the regulation of director liability by corporate codes. In doing
so, Part I examines the remaining vestiges of process integrity in
director exoneration statutes and introduces explanations for that
process integrity even in the face of a trend of liberalization in
director indemnification practices. Part II begins by contrasting the
two major competing models of corporate law: the contract model
and the anti-managerialist model. Part II concludes that, as a
threshold matter, neither contractarianism nor anti-managerialism
accounts very well for the form of the director exoneration statutes.
Part II, at a descriptive level, offers a variety of functions embed-
ded in, and accounting for the ambivalent form of the policy design
for director accountability and exoneration. Among others, these
include: (1) the wrong-remedy dyad; (2) the aspirations to
organizational integrity; (3) the citizenship claim on corporate
directors; and (4) the function of law to offer interpretation and
preservation in the form of discursive open-mindedness within a
closed culture of business persons12 and corporate counsel.' 3
12 See generally James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985) (proffering the classic
statement on the club culture of the corporation).
13 See Mae Kuykendall, Comment on Kostant: Tune in to Hear Stories of
Corporate Governance, the Adventures of the Go-Between and More Exciting
Tales of Corporate Law, 28 J. SocIo-ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Kuykendall, Comment on Kostant] (discussing Professor Kostant's view of
the role of corporate lawyers as both "brokers of information" and fiduciaries to
corporate boards and management) (on file with author).
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Part III of the Article considers the rhetorical mish-mash arising
out of the analysis of director exoneration statutes. Part III argues
that the forms of director exoneration statutes cling to a portrait of
discourse that allows outsiders and insiders to engage in evolving
exchanges about conduct, yet the contract picture of the corporation
proposes a simpler economic exchange driven by the inefficiency
of director liability. Part III explains that the mixture of purposes
presents a phenomenon particularly resistant to a simple account
and provides analysis of the contract model and proposes potential
modifications to the contract model. Part IV suggests several
hypotheses to help explain the form of director exoneration statutes,
including the rent-seeking model, the "team-production" model of
the corporation, public relations, law and literature hypotheses and
post-modem theory. Part V of the Article examines the variety of
policy alternatives underlying director liability, the record of
advocacy for director interest and the mildly contradictory aspects
of the statutes. In the end, the Article leaves the reader at liberty
to adopt her own reading strategy in managing the unruly text of
the corporate codes on director exoneration.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CODE REGULATION OF
DIRECTOR LIABILITY
Corporate codes contain provisions that allow corporations to
eliminate some portions of director liability.'4 These codes allow
corporations to indemnify directors for the expense of litigation,
including the amounts of adverse judgments in third party suits.
They also allow corporations to purchase insurance that covers
some of the litigation costs in defending corporate directors and
possible liabilities. The combination of exculpation provisions,
1" See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831 (1) (West
1993 & Supp. 1999); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (1998)
(providing that a director's personal liability to the corporation or its stockholders
may be eliminated or limited for breach of fiduciary duty, but not for breach of
a director's duty of loyalty or for acts or omissions not in good faith).
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indemnification provisions and insurance has been called the three-
legged stool of director protection. 5
Most director exoneration statutes have the following structural
elements: (1) a permissive and a mandatory section; (2) a substan-
tive standard for both permissive and mandatory indemnification;
(3) process ground rules that identify the appropriate groups for
determining requests for permissive indemnification; (4) non-
exclusivity clauses that suggest that directors may have rights
beyond those enumerated in the code; and (5) rules for the advance
of expenses. The actual role of the limiting rules is unclear. Current
models of director compensation contracts render corporate code
provisions irrelevant in the eyes of some because such contracts
frequently exceed available statutory protections.
These director exoneration statutes also have categories of non-
indemnifiable expenses, such as adverse final judgments or
derivative suit settlements. In general, the statutes try to strike
some balance between the needs of directors for adequate protec-
tion from financial liability and a sense that the corporation should
be protected from improper payments to corrupt directors or for
corrupt purposes. The trend has been toward liberal rules that
provide directors indemnification from liability to the corporation
or its shareholders. 16
"s See Veasey et al., supra note 7, at 400-01 (discussing the change in the
dynamics of corporate governance and the resulting problem of outside directors
refusing to serve on corporate boards without protection of their personal assets).
16 See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 649 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that "the trend in the mid-
1980's has been to liberalize and expand the scope of indemnification"). The
expansion is based on the recognition by courts that indemnification will serve
to encourage qualified individuals to serve as corporate directors. Id. at 650.
Numerous writers may be consulted for further elaboration on the basic structure
of exoneration rules. James J. Hanks, however, has been the principal expositor
of the emerging model of director liability with respect to indemnification. See
generally James J. Hanks, Jr., Changes to Indemnification and Expense Advance
in the Model Business Corporation Act, 9 INSIGHTS 17 (1995) (discussing the
new amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act related to indemnifica-
tion and advancement of expenses for directors and officers); James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability, 43 Bus.
LAW. 1207 (1988) (reviewing legislative responses to perceived liability
problems) [hereinafter Hanks, Director and Officer Liability]. James Cheek also
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Notwithstanding this trend toward liberal indemnification, at
one time corporations were thought to have only a qualified right
to grant indemnification to directors and officers. 7 This traditional
view accounts for the fact that corporate codes typically include
process ground rules to insure integrity in the decision-making of
corporations-i.e., rules to determine whether corporations may
grant indemnification to a particular director. These process ground
rules specify the make-up of the decision-making body that may
grant indemnification in a given instance of director need.1 8 The
rules about process strengthen the credibility of the statutory
conduct standards. Thus, one imagines these rules serving as the
Praetorian guard, vigilant to defend the corporate conscience and
cast disfavor upon wrongful petitions for indemnification by
directors.
These process ground rules and the related concern for
disinterestedness in decision-making on directors' accountability are
at odds, however, with the trend toward liberal indemnification of
directors. These ground rules also are in tension with the loosening
explores the structure of indemnification. See James H. Cheek, III, Control of
Corporate Indemnification: A Proposed Statute, 22 VAND. L. REV. 255, 257-58
(1969) (contending that the legislatures have failed to provide adequate protection
for both directors and shareholders).
17 See New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (Sup.
Ct. 1939).
18 For example, section 145 of the Delaware code provides:
Any indemnification under subsections (a) and (b) (unless ordered by
a court) shall be made by the corporation only as authorized in the
specific case upon a determination that indemnification of the present
or former director, officer, employee or agent is proper in the
circumstances because the person has met the applicable standard of
conduct set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section. Such
determination shall be made with respect to a person who is a director
or officer at the time of such determination, (1) by a majority vote of
the directors who are not parties to such action, suit or proceeding,
even though less than a quorum, or (2) by a committee of such
directors designated by majority vote of such directors, even though
less than a quorum, or (3) if there are no such directors, or if such
directors so direct, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion,
or (4) by the stockholders.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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substantive standards for indemnification, contract provisions
ensuring directors a strong presumption in favor of indemnification
and the policy emphasis on making indemnification an empirically
mandatory assurance rather than a statutorily permissive possibili-
ty. 9 Consequently, the process ground rules or statutory mandate
identifying a corporate decision-making body charged with
superintending its directors so that such a body may limit its grant
of indemnification to directors who deserve to be indemnified is
belied by the overall structure of the corporate code, including the
non-exclusivity provisions of the code20 and the related culture of
corporate law and practice. Thus, as a practical matter, the contract
model of director indemnification largely has prevailed in the
policy debates over such indemnification in many states, in the
Model Business Corporations Act and in the underlying practices
by which directors agree to serve.
A. The Irrelevancy Thesis: Process for What?
Although the contract model of director indemnification largely
has prevailed, the design of the underlying director exoneration
statutes is anachronistic in part and schizophrenic in part. This is
because the same statutes that retain a form of process integrity by
holding onto the process ground rules also increasingly incorporate
the fruits of contract logic developed by corporate lawyers for
advancing the cause of predictability in the personal liability of
directors. Indeed, corporate lawyers drafting director exoneration
statutes incorporate contract logic and advance predictability by
employing indemnification provisions that are not exclusive of
other rights-e.g., contract rights-to which a director may be
entitled. 2' As a result, lawyers are able to draft contracts between
19 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 510-12 (suggesting that the new standard
of indemnification basically exonerates the corporate director from financial risk).
20 See Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 661
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that Pepsico's failure to make an evaluation of the
actions of its directors and officers is made irrelevant by the non-exclusivity
provisions).
2, For example, section 145 of the Delaware Code provides:
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directors and their corporations so that such contracts contain
presumptions favoring a determination that a director is entitled to
indemnification. Yet, while lawyers may be capable of reconciling
this presumption of indemnification with the function of a
corporate decision-making body designed to produce disinter-
estedness and integrity, the average observer may see this form of
decisional disinterest as irrelevant when contract provisions
indemnifying directors reign supreme, or close enough to claim
decisional primacy."
This irrelevancy thesis is strengthened as the reach of the
contract term-i.e., the reservation of a corporate option to deny
indemnification-that provides a role for integrity and disinterest
to monitor conduct standards grows smaller. The enactment of
director exoneration statutes that conform the standard for indemni-
fication to the exculpation provisions of the statutes has diminished
the need for a corporate decision-making body to formulate
standards of director conduct for which monetary forgiveness is
proper. As such, the critical timing issue in the payment of monies
The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by, or
granted pursuant to, the other subsections of this section shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking indemnifi-
cation or advancement of expenses may be entitled under any bylaw,
agreement, vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
22 Indeed, one court has held that the procedural form for integrity is
rendered irrelevant by the non-exclusivity provisions of New York law. See
Pepsico, 640 F. Supp. at 661 (holding that Pepsico's failure to make an
evaluation of the directors' and officers' actions is made irrelevant by the non-
exclusivity rule). Such an interpretation of the reach of the non-exclusivity rule
may be overly robust. Indeed, since Pepsico was decided, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals explicitly has ruled that, under Delaware law, non-exclusivity
does not permit a director to enforce a contract right that calls for indemnifica-
tion without respect to the director's conduct. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity
Serv., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 92-93 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1996) (criticizing Pepsico and
citing treatise authority casting doubt on Pepsico).
Thus, the usual qualification that contracts for indemnification are subject
to the public policy limitations implicit in state corporate codes, see KNEPPER &
BAILEY, supra note 16, at 672, gives life to procedural rules even where a
contract right imposes some constraints on the decision-making autonomy of the
evaluating group.
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has become increasingly less important, given the strong assurances
that the advance of expenses will be available.
In addition, state corporate codes help directors in two ways.
First, the codes employ liberal provisions that lack standards for
advancing expenses resulting from a director's misconduct. Second,
the codes mandate payment of these expense advances to directors
who are indemnified by contract, even if the contract fails to
provide for expense advances as a category of indemnification. The
rules for expense advances typically require no security from
directors, who are required only to assert a belief that they engaged
in conduct triggering indemnification. Indeed, these private
indemnification contracts commonly require that the corporation
advance funds to the director even before a dispute concerning
coverage has been resolved. Thus, a contract right to indemnifica-
tion carries with it an empirical assurance of monies to conduct a
defense, even in the face of opposition by the corporation.
B. The Primacy of Contract and the Compensation Model
The use of contract logic in the universe of indemnification
calls into question the value of, and need for, the regulatory format
of director exoneration statutes. In those statutes where contract law
has become deeply rooted and where private contracts are exten-
sively covered, the option of eliminating the remnants of regula-
tion-derived procedural protections-i.e., the process ground
rules-from the statutes is presented. The contemporary view is to
recognize indemnification provisions in contracts as a form of
compensation. Indeed, directors may ask for indemnification during
their contract negotiations. In many instances, directors will benefit
from the work of corporate lawyers who were responsible for
drafting corporate codes that define corporate interest and director
interest as meshing and, thus, limit the likelihood that directors will
face liability and assure that directors will receive generous
coverage of expenses. This form of corporate code allows contract
efficiency to dominate the formation of the contract between
directors and corporations, where the notion that directors haggle
over terms is mainly metaphorical.
Whatever the merits of the contract haggling metaphor, there
is arguably little reason to single out indemnification provisions in
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directors' contracts as a category of director compensation that
requires a form of unusual process despite the lack of a genuine
object upon which such process can be expended. This is because
the regulatory penalties for directors who act contrary to the
corporate interest has lost support from the corporate bar, has
suffered from the loss of a counterweight generated by academic
fervor and has been seen as misplaced. The claim that director
accountability can be achieved most efficiently by the carrot of
compensation and by indirect pressures for improved performance
are the influential policy assumptions. Indeed, arguments that
justify payments to directors have been persuasive, whereas
punitive programs relating to compensation have failed to persuade
most commentators. The effort to constrain forms of compensation,
including director protection from liability, has become quixotic.
Nevertheless, compensation in the form of indemnification is not
as certain to be realized, as are other types of payments to
directors.
II. THE PRINCIPAL COMPETING MODELS
There are two competing models, the contract model and the
anti-managerialist model, that offer comprehensive explanations of
the regime governing the financial accountability of directors.
These models, however, are seemingly incomplete. In fact, they
struggle to account for the form of director liability in corporate
law today. That is, neither the contract model, nor the anti-
managerialist model satisfactorily explains director liability.
A. The Contract Model
The agency cost model of the corporation,23 along with the
related contract-dominant model of corporate governance,24
23 See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(discussing the impact on corporations caused by general agency costs that arise
in any principal-agent relationship).
24 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, TIiE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (presenting the contract interpreta-
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accounts, in part, for the form that director liability rules have
taken. Thus, both conceptually and practically, the rules for a
director's financial exposure are affected by contract principles and
rhetoric.
At a conceptual level, shareholders are conceived of as the
persons who may exercise a contract-based choice to create
indemnification principles buffering directors from liability.25 The
fact that shareholders are apparently responsible for affording
directors indemnification is seen as a means to an efficient
contractual agreement. 26 This view of efficiency has a lengthy
pedigree and a strong association with the idea that the corpora-
tion's interests are served by the correct pricing of director
service.27 In its first expressions, this notion of efficiency over-
came the formalistic objection that the corporate interest and the
individual interest of directors were entirely separate.2' As the
reasoning about the role of contract in corporate governance
became more fully developed, this notion of efficiency overcame
the legalistic thinking that a breach of the duty of care was a legal
wrong that required a remedy in damages. Instead of resorting to
tion of the corporation).
25 See Hanks, Director and Officer Liability, supra note 16, at 1207, 1233-36
(discussing the liability of directors and the purpose of shielding them from
liability).
26 The efficiency involves a correct matching of economic risk to the risk-
taking enterprise. If the enterprise bears the risk of its activities, inefficient
results of imposing risk on its agents are avoided. Among the inefficiencies of
agent liability are the risk that competent directors will be deterred from serving
as a board member if there is unrealistic exposure to personal liability for
enterprise problems. See Mae Kuykendall, A Neglected Policy Option:
Indemnification of Directors for Amounts Paid to Settle Derivative
Suits-Looking Past "Circularity" to Context and Reform, 32 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1063, 1091-97 (discussing the allocation of costs between agent and
principal in the corporation).
27 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1852-54 (5th ed. 1998) (summarizing court
decisions conceptualizing indemnification as providing a benefit to the
corporation rather than to the director).
28 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 16, at 648 (noting the past reluctance
of some courts to allow indemnification unless it could be proven that the
litigation has been beneficial to the corporation).
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damages, the corporation could create an efficient contract that
priced the risk of negligence to the satisfaction of the parties. Thus,
the insistence of state corporate codes upon extracting a cost for a
legal wrong in our court system gave way to re-conceptualizing a
director's conduct as that of a private party to a contract. A party
to a contract does not commit a legal wrong that demands outside
intervention and correction if the contract provides for a contractual
resolution. In fact, that contractual resolution may include advance
exoneration, which was purchased by any of the many forms of
consideration that a director gives as a party to a private contract
with a corporation.
In line with the teaching of contractarian scholars, the law
moved in the direction of gap filling, where corporate contracts
became the primary source for determining director liability. In
recent years, state corporate codes have added gap-filling provi-
sions to protect directors from harsh interpretations of ambiguous
contract terms. 29 Corporate contract gaps were filled in anticipa-
tion of an agreement that likely would be reached by the parties if
they should address the term. In effect, corporate lawyers who
helped draft corporate codes created the standard terms for
contracts in line with the terms that their clients wanted in their
individual director contracts. These efforts to insert gap-filling
provisions in state corporate codes grew out of the contract roots
implanted in these codes around the 1940s, whereby directors'
protection from wrongful (and inefficient) imposition of litigation
costs could be augmented by further contractual agreement.
Notably, non-exclusivity clauses have established that the indemni-
fication provisions within the state corporate code were "not
exclusive" of other rights afforded to those who sought indemnifi-
cation pursuant to "any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders of
disinterested directors or otherwise. 3 °
29 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-859 (a) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.1564b(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
8.58(a) (1999) (making advancement of expenses mandatory under a contract
providing for mandatory indemnification, unless the contract specifically provides
otherwise).
10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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Thus, the creation of a regime of contract law in the field of
director liability weaves in and out of the state corporate codes and
the individual contracts between directors and corporations. Useful
clauses developed for individual contracts find their way into state
codes and are seen as enhancements of the contract vision of
corporate law. As with other default rules, the rationale for filling
gaps to assist directors is not explicit.31 A rationale that has been
posited for this gap filling is that a well counseled corporate
director would receive the most complete contractual protection
given the realities of corporate contracting. Thus, this rationale
presumes that a shortfall in the protection provided in a director's
contract, such as a failure to include advance of expenses as an
entitlement to indemnification, could not represent a true contract
choice among the parties. Therefore, gap-filling provisions have
been seen as an efficient way to ensure true contract choice
because by inserting the terms that would be found in carefully
drafted contracts these gap-filling provisions favor the general
efficiency served by director protection and avoid the cost of court
resolution of ambiguous contract terms.32
The next form that gap filling may take, and thus, perfect the
contract logic within state corporate codes could be the imposition
of a default contract affording full protection from liability for all
directors-i.e., a standard-form contract would be taken from the
files of the best corporate counsel and would be incorporated in its
entirety into the corporate code. In essence, this would define the
terms that corporate lawyers should insert in contracts between
directors and corporations. For example, a contract term, such as
a presumption that a director's conduct does not preclude indemni-
fication and the requirement of funding her legal costs for seeking
indemnification up to the point at which the director's efforts at
reimbursement have merit-i.e., no final court disposition has made
a determination to the contrary-could be implied from a corporate
31 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (arguing that
the rationale for selection of specific default rules is under-developed).
32 See id. at 93 (arguing that the purpose of saving the cost of court gap
filling is a good basis to choose a default rule in some situations).
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code that decided to incorporate a director contract in its entire-
ty.33 No state corporate code, however, has adopted "contract"
protection for directors to that extent. In fact, the only affirmative
assistance guaranteeing general protection for directors has been
found in mandatory rules. These rules provide that a director must
be indemnified if she prevails on the merits.34 Thus, extending
indemnification so as to allow a default rule favoring full indemni-
fication, except where the corporation proves to a court it is not
merited, would fall within the contract vision that has yet to be
realized. This is particularly so given the view that director
exoneration is efficient and significant numbers of directors do not
enjoy individual contract protection.
Despite the limited scope of the default contract rules assisting
directors, the actual significance of a regime of director liability
and counter protections is colored by the sophistication of the
corporate bar. Indeed, corporate lawyers have developed a
contractual regime for some clients, pursuant to the authority of
corporations to enter into contracts, that protects directors from out-
of-pocket payments for litigation initiated to hold those directors
liable for breaching their duty to the corporation.35 In addition,
3 Michigan Practitioners Form (on file with author).
3 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.52 (1990) (providing that "[a] corporation
shall indemnify a director who was successful on the merits"); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 317(d) (West 1991) (providing for the agent of the corporation to be
indemnified for expenses if the agent has succeeded on the merits); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998) (providing indemnification of
expenses incurred by a present or former director who has succeeded on the
merits); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-418(d)(1) (1993) (providing that
"[a] director who has been successful on the merits ... in the defense of any
proceeding.. . shall be indemnified"); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.52
(1998) (providing that "[a] corporation shall indemnify a director who was
wholly successful ... in the defense of any proceeding to which he was a party
because he was a director of the corporation").
15 See, e.g., Michigan Practitioners Form (creating a contract right to
indemnification for directors) (on file with author). A practitioner reports,
however, that most companies do not have contracts with their directors.
Telephone Interview with Cyril A. Moscow, Member, American Bar Association,
Committee on Corporate Law (Mar. 15, 1999). Nonetheless, the statutory
permission granted in corporate codes, such as in section 145(f) of the Delaware
Code, enhance statutory permission for corporations to grant indemnification by
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corporations have adopted the "contract-in-gross" offered by
statutes that eliminate substantive director liabilities by excising
those liabilities when drafting their corporate charters.36 Further,
state statutes have conformed indemnification provisions to
provisions for the excision of liability,37 which adds to the
contract vision that the voluntary adjustment of risk is rational.
These statutes infer a preference for liberalized indemnification
rules from shareholders opting to limit substantive liability of
directors.38
Given the strong vision of contract that has developed in state
statutes governing exoneration, contract logic should be the simple
explanation of the form taken by rules of director liability. One
may reject, however, this simple contract account because the
statutes fall far short of imposing the contract solution that is truly
efficient and, as a result, liability persists. In fact, the statutes have
attempted to preserve a symbolic connection between the regime
of director liability and other law functions. These functions
include: (1) the preservation of remedies for legal wrongs; (2) the
protection of decisional integrity in a socially significant organiza-
tion, such as a corporation; (3) the insistence on the treatment of
corporate directors as citizens subject to forms of rebuke and
(financial) punishment for morally significant failures to discharge
obtaining enforceable contract rights and casts a "penumbra" of contract over
indemnification. The existing contracts create a template for absorption into the
general practice of providing contract-based protections. In addition, some
authorities report that corporate adoption of individual contracts is common. See
OLSON & HATCH, supra note 7, at 1-8 (stating that "[in recent years many
corporations have supplemented the protection provided by corporate charter
documents through the approval of individual indemnification contracts for
officers and directors").
36 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-851(A)(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-771(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-20.103(1)(b) (1997); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.5 1(a)(2)
(1998) (permitting a corporation to indemnify a director who engaged in conduct
for which broader indemnification has been made permissible or obligatory under
a provision of its articles of incorporation).
31 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 409-501.
38 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 489-502 (1998) (reviewing policy
changes establishing and expanding exculpation of directors).
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their duties; (4) the expressive function of legal decision-making
prompted by claims of legal liability; and (5) the preservation, in
form, of discursive open-mindedness within a closed culture of
business persons and corporate counsel. A purely contract-based
regime would minimize each of these functions as distortions of a
contract resolution addressing the agency costs of director service
because each of these functions relates to a non-contract vision of
the corporation as a social entity with social goals transcending
economically efficient monetary exchanges. Thus, the contract
model alone cannot explain the nature of corporate indemnification
statutes.
B. The Anti-Managerialist Model
Director exoneration statutes also contain aspects of an anti-
managerialist39 approach to corporate regulation and are easily
interpreted as mainly regulatory. Given the combination of code
leeway and the actual practices in corporations, n° however, anti-
managerialism is not a strong check on the granting of indemnifica-
tion to corporate directors when the board is disposed to grant
indemnification. Nonetheless, the effect of anti-managerialism
should not be discounted. The effect of anti-managerialism on
director exoneration statutes precludes the full incorporation of
contract logic into the state corporate codes. The failure of state
codes to adopt a default rule that requires maximum indemnifica-
tion of directors who do not contract for that protection is a
legislative choice with an impact.
" See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 448 & n.7 (describing the judicial
rejection of a director's claim to indemnification under an unqualified provision
guaranteeing reimbursement, without reference to any standard of conduct, as a
clear statement of the regulatory or anti-managerialist norm). See generally
William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corpora-
tion, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180 (1992) (referring to the anti-managerialist
paradigm).
40 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 16, at 673 (suggesting that many
contracts, bylaws and charter provisions provide for indemnification "to the
fullest extent permitted by law").
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The structure of state corporate codes, by failing to establish
greater statutory protection for directors who do not make con-
tracts, creates an anti-managerialist result, and not just an open
term to be filled in by courts. The state codes essentially create a
default rule that is given content by the mandatory requirements of
indemnification for directors who are successful in defending
themselves in lawsuits41 and by the nonexclusivity provisions 42
that invite directors to use "contract" as a device to obtain explicit
protection. Indeed, it would be difficult for a director to argue for
a non-contract based right to mandatory indemnification, where she
did not qualify under the statute for mandatory indemnification.
One could, however, conceive of a regime where the default rule
was influenced by the general, pro-exoneration interpretive rules
43
that presume that directors have an implicit contract right to receive
indemnification, unless the corporation can show its conduct fell
outside the range of reasonable conduct for which reimbursement
should be allowed. Yet, the pro-exoneration tilt of specific
protections creates an adverse inference of non-entitlement without
a contract or a court victory on the merits. Arguably, the resulting
default rule-no right to indemnification without an express
contract or success in litigation-requires an inefficient amount of
contracting to achieve a contract solution that is most preferred by
the parties-i.e., a presumption of indemnification. The existence
of some risk not addressed in the contract between directors and
corporations may bring an element of uncertainty into the mind of
directors. In turn, this uncertainty may influence their decision-
making for the corporation.
41 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(c)
(1995); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1563 (West 1990) (requiring corpora-
tions to indemnify directors that have been successful on the merits for expenses
actually and reasonably incurred in connection with their defense).
42 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1991 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1999) (providing that indemnifica-
tion provisions are not exclusive of other rights the director may be entitled to
under any bylaw, agreement, vote of shareholders or otherwise).
4" See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 457 & n.32 (ascribing to the term
"exoneration" a technical meaning at variance with indemnification or
reimbursement).
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The choice of which risks to contract away is driven by anti-
managerialism. Anti-managerialism accounts for significant features
of the typical state corporate code and for the overall structure of
the exoneration rules. The features of anti-managerialism in the
codes include: (1) the requirement of procedural safeguards in
creating the decision-making group permitted to grant
indemnification;' (2) the general preclusion of indemnification
(even pursuant to court order) of certain payments, such as adverse
final judgments4 or derivative action settlements; (3) the retention
of an inchoate policy limitation on indemnification of "bad"
conduct, such as conduct not in good faith;46 (4) the limitation of
code-mandated indemnification to cases where the director prevails
"on the merits or otherwise"; 47 and (5) the limitation of corporate
4 Statutes frequently mandate that a determination as to indemnification
must be made by one or a combination of the following: (1) a majority vote of
directors who are not party to the suit; (2) a committee of directors designated
by majority vote, even if less than a quorum; (3)independent legal counsel; or (4)
the stockholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (d)(1)-(4) (1991 & Supp.
1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-5(5) (West 1969 & Supp. 1999); TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(E) (West Supp. 1998); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 145(d) (1998).
41 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1991 & Supp. 1998)
(providing that indemnification is precluded unless there are surrounding
circumstances that the court finds allow for indemnity upon application); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1999) (providing that
indemnification is precluded if the judgment or other final adjudication
establishes bad faith or acts that were the result of dishonesty and were material);
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(J) (West 1998) (providing that
indemnification is limited to reasonable expenses actually incurred in connection
with the proceeding, if the person is found liable to the corporation or is found
to have received a personal benefit).
46 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1991 & Supp. 1998) (noting that
indemnification shall be made only as authorized upon a determination that the
person has met the applicable standards of conduct set forth). See also Waltuch
v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1996) (interpreting the
requirement that a director acted in good faith).
41 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998) (requiring
indemnification of a director to the extent successful in defending allegations of
misconduct); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(H) (West Supp. 1998)
(requiring indemnification of a director if she is wholly successful in defending
against alleged misconduct).
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authority to eliminate liability of directors for certain types of bad
conduct.48 A robust contract regime could function, and undoubt-
edly would function more efficiently, without the limitations on
procedure and substance imposed by the codes and with the
assistance of reliable contracts between directors and their corpora-
tions. Thus, anti-managerialism restrains the full blossoming of
contract in the regime of director liability.
At the same time, the effects of anti-managerialism are limited.
The extent of the authority granted in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act ("Model Act") to corporations to cancel liability
with the consent of shareholders is substantial.49 In the Model
Act, the substantive standard of conduct for a director to be eligible
for permissive indemnification is no longer tied to a requirement
that the director was acting in the honest belief that his conduct
was in the best interest of the corporation.50 Proponents of
shareholder protection, however, are concerned about code rules
incorporated into charters by management that enable directors to
force a corporation to finance the director's defense to a suit for
misconduct filed by the corporation itself, even in circumstances
that appear to involve financial high-handedness and personal
enrichment.51 In fact, the effect of anti-managerialism on state
48 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1991 & Supp. 1998) (providing
indemnification only if a director meets the applicable standard of conduct);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1562 (West 1990) (providing indemnification
only if a director acted in good faith and reasonably believed those acts to be in
the best interests of the corporation); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(E)
(West Supp. 1998) (providing that indemnification shall not be made if a director
has been found liable for willful or intentional misconduct in performance of her
duty to the corporation). See also REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51(d)
(1998) (providing that a corporation may indemnify a director for reasonable
expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding, if it is determined that the
director has met the relevant standard of conduct).
41 See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1267 (discussing that despite exceptions
to their coverage typified by the Delaware statute, the result of the Model Act
and shield statutes is to drastically reduce the threat of liability for directors).
50 REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(2) (1998).
"' See Diane H. Mazur, Indemnification of Directors in Actions Brought
Directly by the Corporation: Must the Corporation Finance its Opponent's
Defense?, 19 J. CORP. L. 201, 204 (1994) (describing New Mexico statutory law,
which allows a corporation to pay the director's attorney fees as they are
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codes does not have sufficient bite to preclude payments to
directors in circumstances that pure anti-managerialism would
oppose. Indeed, the dream of a purely anti-managerialist approach
would be to subject all indemnification decisions to outside review
on the grounds that they all are suspect as inside arrangements
among cronies.52 Yet, most indemnification payments are not
contested and are made voluntarily without review by corporate
boards. Thus, the fact that indemnification decisions are not
monitored, even in the face of the contention by the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association that indemnifica-
tion is a critically important corporate function, 3 is a shortfall of
the regulatory, anti-managerialist regime and a basis for rejecting
anti-managerialism as a strong justification for the regime of
liability.
III. CONSIDERING THE MISHMASH
Clearly, the director exoneration statutes retain vestiges of
earlier conceptions of the corporation 54 by requiring positive state
specification of process ground rules and by diminishing limits on
the corporation's power to indemnify.55 Yet, there is a rhetorical
mishmash that has produced a substantial liberalization of these
incurred rather than wait until good faith has been demonstrated, and thus,
permitting the corporation to bind itself to pay).
52 See Cheek, supra note 16, at 281 (proposing that a liberal standard for
indemnification in derivative suits be used, but the determination be placed in the
hands of the judiciary).
" Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Indemnification and Advance of
Expenses, 49 Bus. LAW. 741, 749 (1995). See also REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.50 introductory cmt. 1 (1998) (stating that "[i]ndemnification (including
advance for expenses) provides financial protection by the corporation for its
directors against exposure to expenses and liabilities that may be incurred by
them in connection with legal proceedings based on an alleged breach of duty
in their service to or on behalf of the corporation").
"4 See WASHINGTON & BISHOP, supra note 2, at 99-100 (setting out the idea
of neutral process as a path to reimbursement).
15 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 553-58 (describing how the Model Act's
indemnification provisions water down the standards of conduct directors must
meet to receive indemnification).
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director exoneration statutes even in the face of an overly elaborate
and fading regulatory scheme. Seeking alternative explanations for
the mixed form of director exoneration statutes requires decisions
about the level of theory and the type of evidence to be given
emphasis. One can focus on the groups that participate in the
making of the policy,56 the logical flaws and lack of substantial
regulatory purpose in the statutes 57 and the persuasiveness of the
public policy reason advanced in the course of relaxing director
liability.58 Alternatively, one can focus on the distinct social
product that corporate practices and forms constitute, which
manifests itself in statutory corporate "mythology." Either of these
focuses, however, directs attention away from the concern of
contract law and theory-i.e., the manner in which the law captures
efficient solutions to the making and enforcement of bargains.
A. Analysis of the Contract Model
In corporate law, the contract model has been absorbed
gradually into director exoneration statutes as courts and scholars
have come to recognize both that a corporation involves a set of
contracts 59 and that a corporation should not be sheltered from the
making and enforcement of contracts among the participants. 60
56 See James J. Hanks, Jr. & Larry P. Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide:
The Origins of the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18
U. BALT. L. REv. 235, 242-45 (1989) (describing the business pressure to
liberalize Maryland's indemnification statute as applied by various groups).
" John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919, 930
(1988) [hereinafter Coffee, Opting Out] (referring to the extent of exculpation as
being intellectually dishonest because it exceeds its purported premise).
" See generally Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) [hereinafter Brudney,
Corporate Governance] (arguing that the contract rationale is unconvincing).
'9 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 8-11 (setting out the
"nexus-of-contract" theory of corporations).
6 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 301 (1986) (arguing that close corporation
investors' contracts should be enforced). See also ALA. CODE § 10-2A-307
(1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1991) (providing that a written agreement
among a majority of stockholders is valid notwithstanding the fact that it may
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Courts and scholars also have recognized that formalistic decision-
making about the corporation overlooks the reality that the
participants strike business arrangements that constitute forms of
bargaining from which all benefit.
61
If one takes the contract model seriously and applies it to the
form of the rules governing director liability, the retention of an
institutional format that appears half-hearted at regulating director
misconduct might be seen as a solution to recurring contract
failures made possible by the corporate form and related remedial
premises. This solution may serve the need of the corporate board
of directors for greater protection from the opportunistic behavior
of plaintiffs' counsel in shareholder derivative actions.
Some portions of the institutional format of the corporation
might be explained as just a response to a systemic contract failure
in corporate law. This is because the structure of corporate
remedies permits rogue shareholders to try to evade the contract
between shareholders and management that is intended to give
management freedom to manage.62 Standard corporate doctrines
of director liability threaten the ability of the board to act with any
assurance that a price, in terms of opportunistic litigation, will not
be extracted and that inefficiencies as well as personal inconve-
nience and unfair reputational damage will not result.63 Thus, a
restrict or interfere with the discretion of the board of directors).
61 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 60, at 301. See also REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32 & official cmt. (1998) (authorizing shareholder
agreements and listing requirements that must be met by such agreements).
62 Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271-74 (1986) (indicating problems with shareholder
enforcement of corporate remedies).
63 The reputational element in directors' overall concern with liability is
discussed by Professor Rock, who suggests judicial opinions can have the effect
of shaming directors. Rock, supra note 5, at 1100. Thus, indemnification formats
that not only provide financial relief, but also avert highly visible examinations
of behavior that directors believe is not deserving of critical scrutiny, with an
implicit agenda of moral blame assignment, may serve the director's interest in
avoiding the creation or intensification of unfair losses of both tangible and
intangible kinds. Indeed, protective provisions that require court scrutiny to
afford financial relief are not especially desirable from the point of view of
directors concerned with reputational harm. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2202
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corporate code provision with a provenance that at one time sought
to balance the regulatory concerns of safeguarding the corporate
treasury and enhancing the integrity of decision-making against the
business needs for corporations to indemnify' their directors is
now better explained as serving the perceived need of a board of
directors for protection when it makes decisions in the honest
exercise of business judgment.
The forms of procedural integrity are needed to protect
directors, not to protect the corporate fisc. Even if the statute could
be insincere, the reason is benign, in that efficient decisions need
to be wrapped in the comforting form of procedural regularity that
confirms the existence of, rather than produces, sound outcomes.
The function is one of signaling reassurance to shareholders 65 and
collaterally giving directors the confidence to act as the indemnify-
ing group.
The hypothetical or implicit contract with shareholders might
be seen as having a systemic defect that can be addressed with
statutory magic. That is, if indemnification decisions are likely to
attract lawsuits, the state corporate code can provide structural
safeguards for the efficient operation of ordinary contract arrange-
ments, both the specific contracts extending indemnification to
directors and the contract-in-gross with the shareholders that places
indemnification in the hands of directors. Therefore, contractarian
analysis might provide a perspective that addresses the specific
institutional format of director exoneration.
The primary puzzle under the contract model is not why the
corporate contract tolerates procedural brakes on the operation of
contract arrangements, and thus, on the fulfillment of contract
expectations, but why the default rule is one of no-indemnification
(West 1990) (stating that "[t]he court in which an action for any such penalty is
brought may reduce, remit or suspend the penalty on such terms and conditions
as it may deem reasonable when it is made to appear that the neglect, failure or
refusal was inadvertent or excusable").
4 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 484-89 (describing the regulatory balance
of the former status quo of indemnification rules).
65 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1569 (1989) (suggesting that state action can signal
shareholders that a corporate term is credible).
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in the absence of express contract.66 If cancellation of liability is
on the whole efficient, boards should be allowed to proceed with
discretion, while protected by the cancellation of all liability
predicated on wrongful grants of indemnification. While procedural
window-dressing may not present serious objections to a contract
explanation of director exoneration statutes, an inefficient default
rule does present an objection, in that it exposes some directors to
primary liability and to liability for administering the contract
regime.
One might issue a challenge to public policy-makers to
complete the contract project by enacting fully contractual
exoneration provisions that enhance shareholder choice through
charter provisions that scrap, as obsolete, the principal forms of
state mandated constraints on director financial protection and
instead remit the parties to substantive limits on contract terms. 67
If contrasted with a robust policy of indemnification by contract,
the persistence of a vestige of process regulation in an essentially
post-regulatory regime of director financial liability, even if
possible to reconcile contractual indemnification, is not a feature of
contract logic. Retaining the forms of process integrity in a regime
that emphasizes mutually reinforcing notions of the contract
freedom of shareholders and the contract nature of indemnification
simply is not necessary.
Assuming that corporate counsel has advocated the "dabs of
contract logic" that largely govern the law of director liability in
order to serve intellectual honesty and corporate efficiency, any
hesitation to put forth a fully realized model of contract does not
make sense. This is because a contract model that depends upon
the ordinary rules of contract enforcement and the pressures created
by the corporate context to justify dispersals of corporate funds
under contract agreements best explains the evolution and liberal-
ization of director exoneration statutes.
66 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 454 (describing the acceptance of the
argument that directors' exposure to liability is a problem).
67 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 520-21 (arguing for the elimination of
"statutory relics" because elaborate regulations, such as those governing the
mechanics of process integrity, do not enhance corporate legitimacy).
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In fact, the form of process integrity contained in these statutes
may be a defense-both legal and psychological-to allow
dispersal of funds by corporate boards to their members without the
public responsibility of plenary board action. It may be easier to
dispense largesse if one can point to a body nominally charged
with husbandry that, in fact, has little choice but to shell out
dollars. The form of corporate process integrity in a contract
regime may be mainly a cordon sanitaire between the board and
the defendant directors. Indeed, process integrity may be the
investors' spurious savior, or may represent another corporate
Potemkin village.68
Even if directors benefit from combining contractual resolutions
with the vestiges of process integrity remaining in director
exoneration statutes, it is not completely accurate to assert that the
regime of director liability is a manifestation of contract logic.
Rather, it is an expression of attenuated contract and institutional
form. Both the anti-managerialist model, which focuses on
regulation, and the contract model present anomalies that call for
further policy-sensitive, theoretical inquiry about director liability.
B. Potential Modifications in the Defense of the Contract
Model
In considering improvements to the form of the rules for
director liability, one must examine the intellectual aspiration of the
contract theory to provide general insight into the forms corporate
law may take, and not merely in justifying specific outcomes.69
Indeed, features of contract law might operate efficiently in the
area of director liability if set free to do so. Nonetheless, specific
failures of a contract regime in the context of director liability must
be addressed and the significance of the fact that the contract
68 See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REv. 597, 658-59 (1982) (treating independent
directors as a weak substitute for regulation).
69 There is disagreement about the extent to which the contract theory has
held together as an explanation for the positive law. See Bratton, supra note 39,
at 191-98 (arguing that contract conception cannot explain different aspects of
corporate form).
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model provides a poor explanation for the existence of specific
rules of director liability must be explained.
While indemnification policy alone may not provide a sufficient
basis for choices among alternative theories that purport to provide
coherent accounts of the entire body of corporate law, it is a crucial
area in which general corporate themes of fiduciary obligation,
corporate purpose and modes of accountability converge.v Indeed,
the topic, treated as one of complexity and importance by code-
writers,7' demands consideration of conceptual fundamentals for
purposes of policy enhancement.
In this regard, the contract model strives to account for the
positive law of the corporation.72 If it works as an account of
corporate law, it will be the "best fit" for the form that the
statutory and common law should take. The premise of contracta-
rian theory is that the form of corporate governance law is rational,
coherent and utilitarian.7 3 While various non-conforming phenom-
ena have been accorded explanations as exceptions to the general
picture of contractarianism, v4 these phenomena also have been
described as threatening the coherence of the claim that contractari-
anism offers a comprehensive account of the positive law.75
The contract model can offer a degree of explanation, but the
form tends to explain by explaining away. Procedural protection
provides the opposite of the contract model's apparent functional
rationale. The default rule does not match the contracts-in-fact that
are made when the corporation and the director negotiate to reach
advance agreement. Many directors are subject to a default
rule-i.e., exposure to unreimbursed expense-that contract
proponents insist is not an efficient result that would arise in
70 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 481-89 (explaining the factors involved
in corporate indemnification).
"' See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 53, at 749 (describing the
provisions for indemnification as complex and important).
72 Bratton, supra note 39, at 188.
7' EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 6-7 (describing the incentives
for corporations to adopt profit-maximizing governance structures).
74 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 25-34 (discussing
the problems caused by inefficient and latecomer terms).
75 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 39, at 196 (treating takeover defenses as
demonstrating contract failure).
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bargaining that was unimpeded by transaction costs. Thus, the
positive law fails to respect and incorporate the observable
contracting behavior of the parties. Corporate law makes a half-
hearted acceptance of contract rationales by permitting substantial
contracting to occur at both the corporate level of en masse
exoneration and at the individual level of contract, while failing to
impose the putatively contractarian result on corporations as a
default norm vis-a-vis their directors. Therefore, the positive law
displays a critical loss of nerve in the degree of its incorporation
of contract logic in the indemnification regime.
Nonetheless, there are several salient intellectual alternatives to
explain the current statutory regime in contract terms, even given
non-contract patterns of corporate law and culture. These include:
(1) insistence upon the presence of deep contract realities in the
practice of indemnification and, thus, in the corporate legal culture;
(2) revision of the contract model; and (3) purification of the
underlying statutory data by infusing it with greater contract clarity.
The first and second alternatives are discussed in this Part, while
the third alternative is discussed in the general discussion of policy
alternatives in Part V.
1. The Insistence upon Contract Realities
With regard to finding contract realities, one might point out
that the resistance to unconstrained director exoneration is observed
in the occasional resistance to full enforcement of a contract right
by corporate management7 6 based on a current view of corporate
interests. While process integrity exists in the state director
exoneration statutes, it is not the source of denials of indemnifica-
tion.77 Rather, ordinary principles of contract that allow a party to
a contract to argue against its enforceability on the basis that it
76 See, e.g., Waltuch v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.
1996) (denying relief to a corporate employee who was denied indemnification
for legal expenses incurred in defending against litigation that arose from his
alleged misconduct in his capacity as an employee).
77 See id. at 94-95 (explaining that the usual reason for denying indemnifica-
tion is a change in control of the corporation).
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violates either some specific principle" or a public policy relating
to the subject matter at hand account for denials of indemnifica-
tion.79 Retaining the public policy exception to the enforceability
of contracts is consistent with basic contract principles, and is not
an unusual limitation on contracting. 80 Resistance to contract
enforcement comes about in the course of the unfolding of the
many untold stories of shifting alliances, personal reactions to
undue greed, or other serendipitous forces. 81 Thus, such resistance
that arises is not a regulatory product but the same phenomenon
that drives any effort to disavow or dispute a contract-i.e., a
change in assumptions about the relationship governed by the
contract,82 opportunistic resort to contract doctrines that might
78 A flat promise to reimburse for penalties imposed for theft may be
deemed unenforceable even under ordinary rules of contract. See E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 346 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing public policy
as grounds for unenforceability). On the other hand, where the board of directors
chooses to reimburse for overreaching by directors, there is no ready armory of
legal principles or remedial structure that would routinely defeat the choice.
Courts have traditionally decided against creating limits on board action in
dispensing corporate funds to insiders or for questionable corporate benefit. See,
e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1471 (11th Cir. 1989)
(failing to impose limitations on compensation of managers and directors);
Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 897 (3d Cir. 1953)
(failing to impose limitations on corporate charitable gifts); Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1995) (failing to
impose limitations on the expenses of corporate proxy fights). Doctrines of
corporate waste, although given lip service, have little genuine bite in corporate
controversies. The practical effect of prohibitions on indemnification have always
been weak because there is no one available as an adverse party when
indemnification decisions are made under most corporate structures. See supra
text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussing the lack of conduct-based limitations
on the indemnification of directors by corporations).
'9 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 5.1, at 346 (explaining that contracts
may be unenforceable on the grounds of public policy).
80 FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 5.1, at 346.
81 See Kuykendall, Comment on Kostant, supra note 13 (arguing that
narrative strategies are useful to enrich corporate law).
82 See, e.g., Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 94-95 (explaining that the usual reason for
denying indemnification is a change in control of the corporation).
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allow one relief from inconvenient contract terms,83 or a princi-
pled objection to enforcement of unconscionable terms.'
The fact that resistance to contract enforcement is not a
product of regulation has several implications. First, a feature of
the anti-managerialist component of indemnification rules is
consistent with contract and, thus, need not be viewed as an
anomaly. Second, the contract regime should be freed of an
inchoate idea of a policy limitation on contracts and remitted to the
usual ground rules in contract. A rigorous articulation of the
corporate contract model seemingly would argue that there should
be sufficient protection through the use of ordinary contract terms
that incorporate rules of limited enforceability of invalid contract
terms, the availability of policing as a by-product of the standard
motivations that arise when contract terms are abused and the
shortfalls the market will detect if bad behavior is rewarded in any
given corporation to a sufficient extent to affect its market
value.8 5 The regulatory feature of the statutes may be dismissed
as relatively unimportant formats or rituals that are either at base
consistent with contract or harmless. While contractarianism
celebrates the investor's capacity to render the opaque transparent
and to absorb information and price unsentimentally, 86 the con-
tract view of the corporate code can shrug off low-cost bells and
whistles.
The contract model in its pristine form posits a single explana-
tory heuristic for corporate law: in a word, contract. The leading
expositors of the contract model explicitly downgrade the relevance
of the manifestation of the corporation as an institution.87 The fact
that the institutional form of the corporation creates no results
83 See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562-63 (1918) (illustrating
opportunistic use of corporate doctrine to overcome a contract).
84 See generally Mazur, supra note 51 (describing action against directors
brought directly by corporations).
85 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 6 (describing market
costs of poor governance terms).
86 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 97 (stating that
"[m]anagers of public corporations face a potent information market").
87 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 10-12 (arguing that the
corporation is a financing device and not otherwise distinctive and emphasizing
that the status of a corporation as an entity is not significant).
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independent of the implications of a clustering of transactions in a
longitudinally extended set of agreements88 is what matters. The
contract model creates no characteristic set of scholarly questions
implicated by institutional logic. Thus, the concessions that the
contract model makes to non-conforming data need to be little
more than ad hoc exceptions to the full explanatory power of
contract. Indeed, these concessions can be seen as part of the
contract view of the world, in that they are standard and general
qualifications of the reach of voluntary solutions. 89 These conces-
sions are not created by any unified explanation relating to the
corporate form, but are formed through the working out of contract
logic. The extent of the exceptions has nonetheless given critics an
opening to minimize the overall explanatory power of the contract
model. It has been suggested that the exceptions tell more of the
story than does the core thesis.90
2. The Revision of the Contract Model
Whatever the resolution of the assault on the intellectual
substance of the contract model, the revision of the contract model
presents itself in the indemnification example. There is a distinctive
line of critique and defense. The critique is that, given its relative
indifference to institutional detail, the contract model does not
account especially well for institutional dynamics that create
unusual institutional results in which contractarianism entertains
little interest. Another critique of the contract model is that it lacks
descriptive validity, in that overt contracting between management
and shareholders has not been shown. The answer posited is that
the contract theory of corporate law does not purport to describe
concrete social settings.9' This is a response to the critique of
88 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 8-15 (emphasizing
the longitudinal nature of corporate contracts).
89 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 25-34 (discussing
inefficient terms).
90 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 39, at 180-84 (describing the emphasis on
contract that emerged in the 1980s, supplanting the anti-managerial paradigm).
91 Steven M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL
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thinness-i.e., that the contractarian claim is so abstract as to
disdain particulars that fail to nourish. This response is a blithe
affirmation of the simplifying role of theory.92 The idea is that the
theory, so long as it explains the primary phenomenon, does its job.
The critique of the contract model relating to a gap in its
theoretical account of institutional logic and form, however, is
more overtly concerned with a body of observations that appear to
arise from the institutional setting that has been dismissed by
contractarianism, and that might benefit from a theoretical
framework, not just rationalizations of the limited concern of
contract explanations. This critique is an overt challenge to the
explanatory mission of contractarianism, where the thing to be
explained has been unduly truncated. That is, the persistence of
institutional forms that appear irrelevant under contract principles
seems to call for a branch of the contract theory with an institution-
al mission. Contractarianism has addressed anomalous outcomes,
such as the failure of the market for corporate control,93 but has
failed to explain the form taken by the corporation as an institution.
While the proponents of the contract model might dismiss the
details of institutional design94 as unduly particular and of limited
importance to the explanatory genius of their construct, it seems
fair to comment that contractarianism does not account for the
cultural manifestation in the world of the corporate construct. The
contract model also does not account for: (1) the elements of law
that set out the general outlines of the cultural phenomenon; (2) the
format of corporate "folkways"; 9' and (3) the vocabulary in which
L. REv. 856, 883 (1997).
92 id.
" See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell et al., Market for Corporate Control: Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. EcON. PERSP. 49, 64 (1988) (suggesting poison pills
have a negative effect on stock prices).
9' See generally Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis
of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393
(1996) (suggesting that a microanalysis of institutions will yield insights that
expand the scope of economic inquiry). Rubin, however, treats law and
economics as a potential source of an institutional focus.
" See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L.
REv. 1970, 1970 (1997) (suggesting that business community ideology, which
contains non-economic factors, is overlooked by law and economics).
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the corporation is situated. At a minimum, it seems fair to ask of
contractarianism that it give a further explanation of the form of its
bracketing of institutional specifics, at a level of theory, that
accounts for the array of phenomena for which other explanations
are demanded, the theoretical weight of the material bracketed and
the types of theoretical level accounts that might be relevant to the
contract theory.
One option for the proponent of the contract model may be to
dismiss, as trivial, great swaths of corporate law and culture, which
is an alternative not entirely out of sync with the tenor of other
scholarship9 6 and other views of the contemporary culture. 97 The
argument, however, must be not that there is no set of observations
that cluster around a set of practices that arise from institutional
dynamics, but rather that they are quite explicitly unimportant even
though much energy is expended on maintaining and rationalizing
them. Indeed, the contractarian might argue that institutional
practices are a fit subject for cultural studies, but not the concern
of business law.
96 See generally Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (positing a "triviality hypothe-
sis" regarding state corporate law-i.e., all corporate law is trivial and allows
corporations to set any form of governance rules).
" Post-modem approaches to forms of social expression are in some
instances agnostic about the significance of any particular set of practices in
terms of the discursive role that they play. Indeed, interpretations of popular
culture go so far as to suggest that forms of entertainment have to a degree
supplanted reality where "life [itself has become] the new fountainhead of
images, narratives, stars and themes." See NEAL GABLER, LIFE THE MovIE: How
ENTERTAINMENT CONQUERED REALITY 58 (1998). The idea that there are
forums, both in the courts and within the corporation, where narratives of moral
significance are produced and heard, may be itself primarily an image or a
narrative of narrativity in which the narratives are not required, but only the
celebration of their existence. Law and economics in corporate law may not be
prepared to do much more than shrug off the phenomena of statutes serving as
what one might call "echo narratives" because its ultimate subject is money, a
matter that transcends the ephemera of texts that constitute a sort of movie of
corporate life.
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IV. CONSIDERING OTHER THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
APPARENT ANOMALIES OF DIRECTOR LIABILITY RULES
Other theoretical possibilities present themselves to account for
the form that director liability in the form of both statutes and
practice assumes. For instance, it is possible that corporate counsel
preserve a regulatory form as a means to capture rents. A second
analysis, linked to the team production model, focuses on the
evolving role of the corporate board and its possible need both for
a cushion from retaliation by the disparate interests within the
corporation when it mediates and for the benefit to board decision
making of corporate bodies with a mission of assessment and
evaluation. Along similar lines but couched in terms of literary
analysis and public relations theory, it is possible that the content-
less form impounds aspiration to self-critique characteristic of
complex contemporary organizations and is, thus, a useful form of
organizational make-believe. Finally, and more ominously, one
might consider that the law of director liability belongs in a post-
modern world of discontinuities, discursive containment strategies
and legal ornamentation demanded in a post-regulatory corporate
code.
A. The Rent-Seeking Model
Focusing on the process of policy-making leads one to consider
whether the trend in director exoneration statutes is best accounted
for by a rent-seeking model98 of corporate policy-making, which
maintains a concern for the appearance of regulating director
misconduct. The regulatory form of the statutes might be seen as
a smokescreen to cover indifference on the part of corporate
counsel to self-serving or excessive indemnification awards. The
narrowly conceived self-interest of corporate lawyers is perhaps
served by combining several interests. These include: (1) protection
of their managerial clients through the enactment of favorable
98 See BUTLER, supra note 8, at 107 (discussing rent-seeking).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
legislation;99 (2) protection of their own interest by perfecting the
contract model used in actual practice by enacting "belt and
suspenders" provisions in the corporate code that avert nasty
surprises when contracts are not effective in protecting directors'
rights;' 0 (3) generous provision for advance of expenses that pay
legal fees and preserve client nerves; (4) acceptance of a default
rule that requires explicit contracts for assurance of protection; (5)
maintenance of a facade of procedural integrity that avoids full
acknowledgment that the hypothetical contract freedom of share-
holders has been exercised to eliminate most exposure of directors
to scrutiny related to corporate liability-based standards of conduct;
and (6) use of that facade of integrity as a mechanism to give
board members reassurance that indemnification can be made
legally and with protection from secondary lawsuits charging
wrongful indemnification. 10
99 See generally MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (discussing path
dependency and the culture of legislation).
'00 A good example of a "belt and suspenders" provision that protects
corporate counsel as well as corporate clients is the broadening of the meaning
of indemnification in statutes that bless contract promises to indemnify. In
response to a Delaware case that construed a promise of indemnification not to
include advance of expenses, statutes have been revised to include the advance
of expenses within the term indemnification for purposes of contract promises.
See supra Part II.A, discussing gap-filling code provisions to protect directors
from narrow interpretations of nebulous code provisions.
101 "The[] [boards] want to ... [give indemnification] legally and make it
the business judgment rule." Telephone Interview with Cyril A. Moscow,
Member, American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law (Mar. 15,
1999). See also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1278-80 (describing the evolution of
the corporate governance model toward a process-based monitoring model that
the Delaware courts respect). One is struck most strongly, in considering the
indemnification example, that procedural protections perform distinctly different
functions for the court as opposed to the corporate managers and direc-
tors-i.e.,the statutes that offer reassurance to judges of regularity and integrity
also offer pro forma rituals of affirmance to inside corporate interests that in
many instances (but not always) serve to protect directors from liability for good
corporate decisions. But, the indemnification example seems the most veiled
about its dual regulatory and ritualized purpose, because it is couched in a statute
that purports to set outside substantive limits on the transaction subjected to
procedural safeguards. The proceduralism impounds an expectation of analytic
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Thus, the telltale sign of rent-seeking behavior would be the
imposition of non-market solutions that restrict market logic from
operating and that divert resources to those benefitting from the
availability of rents. The form that rents appear to take in the
rigor and balance and a theory of substantive regulation, but ultimately it is
widely understood as a means of accomplishing an assumed goal-indemnifica-
tion-while giving protective coloring to the board. See Kuykendall, supra note
3, at 457 & n.32 (coining the phrase "exoneration canon" for the loose set of
statutory and case law doctrines that point toward the award of financial
protection to directors).
In contrast, the "conflict-of-interest" statutes, or "interested-director"
statutes, impound no regulatory theory at all, leaving the matter of limits entirely
to boards and courts. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 684-88 (7th ed. 1995). These statutes
are not necessarily understood as a facilitative means of blessing foregone
conclusions. The openness of the question leaves room for expressive develop-
ment of a theory of director interest and corporate structures of decision-making,
whereas the indemnification regime tends to choke-off the articulation of a
normative regime of indemnification and does not invite court scrutiny of
corporate internal logic. See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 510 (discussing the
shift of practical authority to render adjudicative judgments from the courts to
the corporation).
The indemnification example and the curious contradiction in purpose, or
the process nominally framed to produce expressive efforts at self-scrutiny
comparable to what a court might produce harnessed to a set of standards
intended to produce an entitlement to exoneration in most cases, creates a
deficient outcome. Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 510-12. This outcome is devoid
of the type of effect on belief-systems that Professor Eisenberg has described as
one of the key products of the system of corporate law and social norms.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1291. The indemnification culture in corporate law
is dominated by a concern with financial outcomes and is increasingly disjoined
from the aspirational or expressive function of corporate law. Indeed, it may be
argued that it is worse than disjoined. Rather, the indemnification culture
produces a regime of counterproductive discourse that rejects the expressive
content of the system of corporate adjudication. See Kuykendall, supra note 3,
at 507-12, 538-43, 570-77 (discussing the new standard of indemnification as an
efficient avoidance of liability for corporate directors). The optimism of Professor
Eisenberg's portrait of self-enforcing social norms is reliant, to some extent, on
the still somewhat robust regime of corporate liability in Delaware, which has
not adopted the extent of exoneration of the Model Act, and to some extent on
a notion that social norms, once implanted, can survive without the same
mechanisms of expression that liability helps to generate.
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regime of director liability is the demand for legal services created
by a regulatory format-i.e., lawyers collect fees for a result that
could be achieved far more directly10 2 and without the collection
of rents by lawyers. The failure to mandate indemnification for
persons discharging a socially necessary function in complex
organizations benefits the corporate lawyers more than anyone else.
An approach that requires an inefficient amount of private
contracting for directors to be guaranteed protection and that
requires procedures that empower lawyers to give specific grants
of indemnification under generous permissions for corporate
payments fails to extend directors the sufficient amount of
protection and fails to guard the corporate fisc by adding to the
fees of lawyers. The lawyers who write the law and superintend the
rhetoric for director liability are the obvious principals in a rent-
seeking model of director liability. The directors are just the source
of a transactional cost opportunity. Directors are not the rent-
seeking principals in the policy-making world of corporate law.
Rent-seeking by corporate lawyers offers a robust explanation for
the rationale underlying the half-hearted adoption of contract
principles in a regulatory format. Arguably, it fits the data better
than either the contract or anti-managerialist theories. The policy-
making seems not to arise from a disinterested consideration of all
the competing interests, but rather tends to serve narrow interests
of various kinds. 103
112 See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 520 (suggesting a direct route to protect
directors from liability).
103 In a prior article, I described the triumph of exoneration principles in the
Model Act as "corrupting indemnification." See generally Kuykendall, supra note
3. The reference to corrupting indemnification may have been mildly tendentious.
The term, however, is not all oratory. It also describes, in a neutral fashion, a
degeneration of the logic of the indemnification statutes from a matching of form
(process integrity) and function (application of limits derived from aspirational
norms) to a disjunction of form (process integrity) and function (protection of
contract entitlement to indemnification and assurance of director protection from
liability). The general conceptual understanding of the indemnification function
has shifted away from that of a procedural format in which to express and guard
norms to a line of defense against director liability on a par with exculpation and
insurance. See Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 538-43 (arguing that the abolition of
director liability lends itself to a sacrifice of the principle of accountability).
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The problem with a rent-seeking explanation, however, is that
the genius of human efforts embedded in social collaborations is
not considered. 4 This skepticism about human motives over-
looks the possibility that a complex arrangement may reflect a
messy and partly successful effort to incorporate the result of
human invention and culture-i.e., contract efficiency, or some
other human artifact that serves general purposes.
B. The Team Production Model
A possible alternative explanation for the evolution of director
exoneration statutes to a pre-regulatory and post-regulatory state of
supervisory indecision might be the pressures on corporate counsel
associated with the "team production" model of the corporate board
of directors recently proposed by Professors Stout and Blair 05
and expanded by Professor Kostant by bringing attention to the role
of corporate counsel °6 The team production model posits that
the board of directors functions as an arbitrator among the
members of a corporate team tied to the corporation by the
investments they have made that cannot be readily withdrawn. 17
Professor Kostant's work adds to that vision by proffering practical
questions about the role of corporate counsel in providing the
information and intermediation needed for the board to do its work
of reconciling the demands of the corporate team members. 10
8
While significant issues arise concerning the viability of the team
production model, given the fact that corporate lawyers are
'o4 See generally James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in
Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161 (1987) (questioning the imposition of the
language of economics on cultural patterns).
'o' See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout,
Team Production] (discussing the team production model).
" Peter C. Kostant, Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate
Governance and Counsel's Changing Role, 28 J. SocIo-EcONOMICS (forthcoming
2000) (on file with author).
107 See Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 105, at 249-50
(discussing an alternative approach to the prevailing principal-agent model of the
public corporation).
108 Kostant, supra note 106.
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themselves rational maximizers with goals independent of team
members, this model carries with it possible explanatory power for
the vexing form taken by the director exoneration statutes.
The statutes might be explained as the result of efforts by the
corporate bar to remove the onus of financial liability from
directors, whose tasks have evolved in a direction that partially
resembles statecraft, while retaining formats that utilize mediating
bodies with potential for assessment and evaluation of board
performance. The vestige of regulation, tied to financial exposure
in director exoneration statutes, might not be matched well to the
role that a board, capable of disinterested adjudication, has played
in post-hoc assessments of director performance. For example, the
regulation in director exoneration statutes is not explained well by
the board's role in contested corporate transactions where the board
appears to defy shareholder preferences, nor is it explained well by
shareholder wealth-maximizing principles. The reasons underlying
the regulation, however, may be captured to some extent by the
team production model. As the extent of exculpation and the
enforceability of contract indemnification promises increases, the
likelihood that a statutorily specified group would negatively
scrutinize board conduct in a contested transaction decreases. This
is best explained by the fact that the statutorily specified group has
a small role to play given the greater capacity of a director to claim
a status of entitlement to indemnification." 9 An expanded claim
of entitlement displaces a process of respectful petition for the
exercise of judgment by the specified group that must determine
whether a director's conduct rises to a level that merits indemnifi-
cation. "'10
The team production model may provide the rudiments that
give an account of the policy reasons for maintaining the role of a
statutorily specified group to assess and evaluate director conduct,
even though directors are buffered from financial loss. The group
may serve as the corporate conscience even without it withholding
109 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement
for a statutorily specified group charged with making indemnification decisions
and the extent of freedom in granting directors indemnification based on rights
found outside state corporate codes).
"0 Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 514-15.
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funds from miscreant directors' legal war chests. This is because
the team production model, infused with an idea of reconciling
interests bonded in an organizational setting, is institutionally
compatible with the retaining of a form that aspires to self-
examination by corporate boards. Indeed, according to commenta-
tors on Professor Kostant's work linking the team production
model to the role of corporate counsel, the assessment and
evaluation of director misconduct should be afforded greater scope
than it has been afforded in any contemporary public corpora-
tion.1 ' Rather than a cynical ploy to eliminate financial liability
while maintaining an appearance of regulation, the somewhat
labored compromises imbedded in the director exoneration statutes
may be conceived of as a work in progress by a corporate bar
struggling to find a role as a fiduciary-bonded steward of corporate
institutional welfare. In some respects, there may be an evolution
of corporate counsel's image of itself as a fiduciary of an entity
that is comprised of disparate interests requiring a format of
decision that mimics adversary logic, to the notion that it is a
servant to one master made up of different parts benefiting from
internal dialogue."1 2
Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the team production
model provides a complete explanation for the form of director
exoneration statutes. This model of statecraft applies to the boards
at large public corporations" 3 and is not particularly well suited
to the boards at the variety of intermediate business enterprises,
where managerial errors are often made by the financial shark
rather than the political neophyte or blunderer." 4 One-size-fits-all
.. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Response to Peter
Kostant's: "Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Governance and
Counsel's Changing Role," 28 J. SocIo-EcONOMICS (forthcoming 2000) (on file
with author) (emphasizing the relevance of negotiations, compromise, reputation,
disclosure and public pressure in the team production model).
112 Telephone Interview with Peter C. Kostant, Associate Professor of Law,
Roger Williams School of Law (May 27, 1999).
113 See generally Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984)
(discussing the real-world conduct of directors in large corporations).
114 See generally Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of
the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 265 (1998) (explaining the problem of
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director exoneration statutes seem ill-advised. Even for the large
corporation for which the team production model matches the data
well, the statutory retention of an independent body whose
activities are triggered only by specific instances of board mem-
bers' exposure to lawsuits' 15 and whose discretion is confined by
contract commitments to directors is not well designed to perform
the general monitoring of the quality of board performance called
for by a commitment to an elevated board process of the kind
Professor Dodd once described.1 6 In an information age,117 the
benefits of process integrity and independence in a "team-produc-
tion" corporate setting have less importance as a form of interven-
tion in the loosely monitored arena of individual financial outcomes
achieved by directors" 8 and much greater importance as a form
of intervention in framing questions of corporate governance, in
sharking as well as shirking).
115 In a typical statutory provision, the role of the group chosen to supervise
corporate responses to directors' requests for indemnification arises from the
statutory requirement that indemnification may "be made [only] by the
corporation ... as authorized in specific cases upon a determination that
indemnification... is proper in the circumstances." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1564a(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999). While laws typically allow other
contract arrangements to be made (see, e.g., id. § 450.1565(1) (West 1990)), the
group chosen to supervise corporate responses to indemnification requests has no
role in determining whether the contract arrangement serves the corporate interest
or furthers the function of articulating corporate norms. Because corporations
usually provide protection to their directors up to the fullest extent permitted by
law, they are essentially free-riding on the lobbying and litigating successes that
may occur in the future and avoiding any obligation to make internal policies
that enhance accountability through the indemnification process.
116 See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932) (discussing the obligations of
corporate trustees).
117 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Keynote Address at the Business Law Workshop,
Association of American Law Schools, Washington, D.C. (May 2, 1998)
(describing emerging infrastructures that influence institutional investors to be
active in corporate governance matters).
118 See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 58, at 1411-12
(describing managerial power to divert wealth to managers). See also Detlev
Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?,
8 J. CORP. L. 231, 273 (1983) (concluding there is a lack of constraint by
markets over individual excesses).
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fashioning narratives of corporate events" 9 and in producing data
that might serve as a basis for enriching the team approach to
corporate governance.
Thus, if corporate code writers should take the team production
model seriously as a source of insight about the corporate project,
the aspects of the director exoneration statutes designed to bring
process integrity to indemnification decisions should recede and be
replaced by rules providing statutorily specified groups with
broader evaluation and assessment powers. The trends of the last
several years in the corporate governance movement already have
created preliminary models for groups routinely charged with
assessment and evaluation. 120 These groups mostly arise from
pressures created by the desire for sound corporate practice, stock
exchange requirements and by voluntarily imposed guidelines,
121
119 Special litigation committees with a mission to assess and evaluate the
need for corporate litigation are an example of a body created in response to the
agency model of the corporation. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 784-88 (Del. 1981) (permitting the court to fashion its own business
judgment, but affording the special litigation committee a role in the dismissal
of a derivative suit commenced on the basis that the board could not exercise
business judgment itself to consider the appropriateness of such a derivative
action); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1979) (applying
the business judgment rule to the dismissal recommendation of the special
litigation committee-i.e., the board group allowed to recommend dismissal of
a suit against a tainted board). Given the adversarial events that require the use
of the special litigation committee, those committees generate legal narratives
guided by a conservative interpretation of the imperatives of the corporate
enterprise. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (recognizing that a determination whether a lawsuit should be pursued
"requires a balance of many factors, [including] ethical, commercial, promotional,
public relations, employee relations, fiscal ... [and] legal"). Special litigation
committee narratives posit a corporation whose interests may not be well served
by litigation. The narrative is heavily flavored by preferences for a trimmed
down discursive process and disfavor for the uncontrolled discourse created by
litigation. Discourse in litigation contexts is seen as costly, in part, because of the
loss of corporate control over the premises and the content of corporate
narratives.
120 See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1278 (describing the shift from the
managing to the monitoring board).
121 See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
8 (1995) (discussing board structure).
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rather than by state corporate codes. The notion of independent
board members 122 also adds to the environment of assessment and
evaluation in a context that fails to bond independence to share-
holder primacy. Certainly, those who have pressed for indepen-
dence on the board imagine it as a source of a larger view of the
corporation, and not just as a means of purifying the agency
function in a shareholder wealth maximizing model. 23 The
functions that are emphasized in models of enhanced assessment
and evaluation relate to corporate compliance with law, a concern
that has less to do with agency concerns than it has to do with the
corporation's role in society.1 24 Retaining process integrity for the
purpose of facilitating assessment without a close link to solving
an agency problem is a good fit for other trends in corporate law,
but does not provide a good explanation for maintaining such
process integrity even in the face of the trend toward liberal
indemnification of directors. 125
C. Law and Literature, Public Relations and Post-Modem
Theory
A loosely related set of materials consisting of law and
literature approaches to the study of legal texts, public relations
models of modern organizations and post modern theory provide a
rich source of interpretation of corporate indemnification statutes.
Recent cultural commentary on the relation between public
relations and a process of "self-investiture," by which corporations
"elevat[e] themselves into an empyrean realm of abstraction,
122 See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1253-54 (arguing that directors are
motivated by financial gain).
123 See Steven M. H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate
Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
163, 173 (1991) (discussing how stakeholder statutes are not stakeholder statutes
in fact, but reminders to the corporate board to serve the entity).
124 See supra note 48 (providing examples of statutes that limit or deny
indemnification because of certain bad acts by directors or violations of
applicable standards of conduct by directors).
125 See Wallman, supra note 123, at 170-72 (arguing that corporate best
interest refers to the corporation as an entity functioning within society). See also
Bratton, supra note 39, at 212-15 (describing the mediative function).
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purged of commercial motives, '126 positions some portions of the
corporate code as an extension of corporate image-making that
lacks any other function relating to corporate interest. But, public
relations reflect real concerns about good conduct. The purported
effect of rhetoric on practice posits public relations as causing
corporations to develop corporate cultures with aspirational
content.127 The forms of process integrity in the area of indemni-
fication may be a reasonable social facsimile of a soul'28 or the
statutory equivalent of judicial sermons on corporate law. 129 The
director exoneration statutes warn of sermons to come by wagging
a finger at the fearsome taking of accounts by the corporation and
the courts. In essence, the law is acting as a go-between that
delivers sham threats, 130 but directors fear the reckoning, nonethe-
less.
This conclusion arises from a view of social hypocrisy as the
tribute vice pays to virtue at large. The remnants of regulation
provide a degree of ritualized duty and conscience that a board
should fulfill. The board's fiduciary duty requires that one believe
that there is an appearance of a corporate mechanism to regulate
directors. But, that corporate mechanism is really the celebration
and defense from being abandoned as an ideal of the remnants of
process integrity in state director exoneration statutes.13' Insincere
remnants of regulation, however, may be seen as a shrine to the
body of law that has given corporations a structure to their
126 Fred Miller Robinson, Run It Up the Flagpole: How Corporate America
Got the Folks at Home to Salute, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, § 7 (Book
Review), at 21 (reviewing WILLIAM L. BIRD, JR., "BETTER LIVING": ADVERTIS-
ING, MEDIA, AND THE NEW VOCABULARY OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP 1935-1955
(1999); ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF




129 See Rock, supra note 5, at 1016.
13' Kuykendall, Comment on Kostant, supra note 13. Of course, some
interpretations suggest that the go-between is more credulous than the corporate
principals.
131 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1253. See also Rock, supra note 5, at 1013
(proposing that Delaware cases act to transmit norms).
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obligations that transcends contract and requires board members to
assume a duty of care and loyalty. 32 Our imaginations require
more than private contracting parties able to liquidate personal risk.
As with ancient physical shrines, the hollowed out remains of
regulation in director exoneration statutes serve better than do new
structures to evoke the meaning embodied in the artifact.
Post-modem analysis does not have a unified theory 133 and
the subject of director liability is not the best place to summarize
postmodem materials. One salient thesis of post-modernism,
however, is that the predominant forces at work in society control
discourse in a manner that invariably absorbs challenges into the
prevailing system. 134 Post-modernism also emphasizes the discon-
tinuities in discourse, the breakdown of the "subject" as a coherent
image and the general fragmentation of perspective. The Internet
has accelerated the impression that discourse consists of pastiches
of text and image that are sometimes jarring and always arbitrary,
at least, in part. Post-modernism is often associated with concerns
about the determinacy of texts. 35 Yet, even clear texts may be
read as an expression of post-modem discontinuities, suppression
of terms and complications in reading the subject.136 Legal text
132 See Rock, supra note 5, at 1011-16.
133 STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY 4 (1991).
134 See id. at 285.
135 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 211-20 (1988) (explaining post-structualism and attacks on the
objective meaning of texts).
136 The bias in favor of examining constitutional law in the law and literature
movement, which has been noted by Professor Rock, see Rock, supra note 5, at
1016 n.15, has the additional effect of conflating issues about the reading of texts
with questions of determinacy. Yet, the undertaking of describing a body of
writing using literary analyses and methods as the organizing premise implicates
far more than issues of determinacy. Rather, the whole social formation of a
body of related texts is a complex collaborative product that can be read for
many purposes besides assessing the clarity of its rules, or worrying about
author's intentions as the source for interpretation of their meaning. Authors
convey the texture of a world by striving to render a catalogue of that world's
concerns and by choosing a language adequate to convey that catalogue of
significance. Thus, bodies of law can be approached as a literary subject of sorts
without concern for the specific, rule-centered meaning of the material.
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exists for purposes other than giving clear commands-i.e.,
corporate statutes convey the form and function of the corporation.
Despite the power of state corporate codes to evoke dread, their
text is post-modem. The director of the corporation is less
contextualized than it was in prior treatments and, in certain
respects, the class of corporate directors and managers is amor-
phous. The key feature defining the persona of the director in
contemporary academic writing about liability is the exposure of
the director to monetary loss that may be inefficiently priced. If
rules on indemnification create a "dock" for directors, it is created
without the director visible, except for the director's risk of
uncompensated loss. Even though one strain of writing about the
director evokes fervor about the crushing of the powerless
individual corporate director, 13 7 such writing does not successful-
ly embody the character of financial liability. Nor is the powerless
portrayal of the individual director's ability to defend against the
threat of liability convincing as narrative or as characterization.
Thus, the regime of director liability is post-modem in the extent
of its abstraction about directors upon whom its moral concerns are
directed because there is dread without a human repository.
Without venturing into the larger themes of the end of history
that veer between an optimistic account of an ideologically mature
society not in need of politically charged interpretations and an
account of a society in which technology is in charge, 138 one is
certainly struck by the absence of any vivid picture of the "direc-
tor" as a historical figure-i.e., a figure with a past and a future
rather than a mere present and unembodied function. Despite the
fact that director liability is concerned with a concretely situated set
of individuals who might have stories that are compelling, the
writing on director liability contains little analysis of those stories
even though the audience of such writings-directors and law-
yers-most likely would be interested in those stories. 139
137 Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 451.
13' BEST & KELLNER, supra note 133, at 275.
139 In contrast to my observation about the lack of stories in an area of
corporate law where the main topic is the moral assessment and punishment of
persons, Professor Rock has argued that Delaware corporate law can be
understood as a set of narratives through which corporate actors are instructed
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In addition, discontinuities appear in the text of the director
liability statutes that postulate form, but also remove substance.
This is because the ultimate product is texts that have been moved
around with the ease of the word processing functions of cutting
and pasting, so that the theory underlying financial liability of
directors may be used to justify legal outcomes, just as when the
court posits a remedy of corporate litigation that necessarily
imposes a cost on innocent shareholders. 40
The texts of director liability regulation and the related cultural
and legal commentary are subject to post-modem readings. To the
extent that a post-modem interpretation is persuasive, the search for
the best policy answers is probably vain. Nonetheless, examining
policy choices makes sense because of the insight one might gain
into good policy choices, the clarification of existing policy through
comparison with alternatives and the theoretical implications of the
policy consensus against innovative changes in director liability
rules.
V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Several policy alternatives exist that may ground the statutory
scheme of director exoneration statutes in a conceptual conviction.
Considering the array of policy choices available highlights the
contrast between the extent to which policy-makers genuinely
embrace a strongly contractarian view and the extent to which
code-writers embed a more complex set of interests in corporate
governance statutes.
in morally significant aspects of their calling as managers and directors. Rock,
supra note 5, at 1013. In a work in progress on narrative, I argue that corporate
law is characterized by an absence of narrative, the implications of which I
continue to explore in that manuscript. See Mae Kuykendall, Business Law and
Narrative (Nov. 16, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
140 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 4-6 (Del. 1993) (holding
that a shareholder's class action suit is not against a corporation's interests, in
part, because directors may be required to pay damages if the corporation must
pay damages to the shareholders).
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A. Frank and Open Deregulation, Giving Contract Its Due
There are several possible approaches to deregulation. As a
practical matter, deregulation always stops short of a full opt-out
from the fiduciary duty owed by directors. 4 ' But, indemnification
is not the same as a release from fiduciary duty.'42 This view is
sharpened as commentators notice the increased gap between the
standard of conduct and the standard of liability in corporate
law. 143
1. Subjecting Indemnification to General Corporate Standards
One possible statutory approach is to allow ordinary corporate
ground rules to govern the indemnification of directors for any
conduct without articulating any indemnification-related statutory
limitation whatsoever. It would not work simply to remove the
indemnification statute because the initial rationale for indemnifica-
tion statutes was to overrule common law cases that unrealistically
barred all indemnification while limiting corporate power to
exonerate fiduciaries. 1" One could draft, however, a one sentence
indemnification section that provides: "Indemnification rules, and
indemnification in specific cases, shall be made in good faith based
upon the best interests of the corporation."'
4 5
141 Coffee, Opting Out, supra note 57, at 924 (proposing that contract law
supply equitable limitations on the opt-out from corporate law).
142 Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 447.
143 See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 437
(1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards] (emphasizing the
separate functions of conduct and review standards); Chief Justice E. Norman
Veasey, Supreme Court of Delaware, Remarks at the Business Law Workshop,
Association of American Law Schools (Washington, D.C. May 2, 1998)
(highlighting the diverging standards of rules of liability).
'44 CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BuSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 371 (2d ed. 1996).
14' Note that this would be consistent with Professor Rock's thesis about the
actual content of Delaware corporate law. See Rock, supra note 5, at 1015
(describing the simplification of corporate law expressed as a general standard
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Such a simple statement of the rule for director indemnification
would displace sections that arguably have become overelaborate
refinements of a tortured statutory path to liberalized indemnifica-
tion practices. The standard underlying this rule overtly displaces
the brittle and poorly expressed rule1" and frees the corporate
contract regime to serve the functions of general rule-making and
evaluating of individual applications of directors pursuant to
negotiated agreements. Objection to this rule by corporate lawyers
on the basis of regulatory concerns would seem unpersuasive.
Thus, the question arises whether there is a coherent and
principled objection under contract principles to a simple rule
placing the indemnification decision within standard corporate
logic. Seemingly, the contract concern would be to correct systemic
contract failure. Because the contract argument posits that market
discipline is generally adequate to check managerial shirking,
concern for systemic failure does not lie on the side of rent-seeking
excesses in indemnification. If indemnification decisions were made
that lacked any corporate rationale and were not in good faith, the
usual contract remedies would be available. Therefore, the concern
for contract failure relates to shareholder opportunism abetted by
the structure of corporate litigation. This concern might be
alleviated, however, by the substantial protections in place that both
limit litigation"' and shut off liability.141
2. Treating Indemnification Grants as Conflict of Interest
Transactions
If using general corporate standards to make indemnification
decisions were seen as sufficient, the state corporate codes already
contain generic provisions that allow suspect transactions to trigger
curative procedures. Provisions to approve conflict-of-interest
transactions seem fully applicable. Like the indemnification
of good faith once proposed for Delaware and argued by Professor Rock to
represent the actual content of the Delaware law).
146 Rock, supra note 5, at 1017.
147 See supra note 119 (discussing responses by corporations to limit
litigation brought in the right of the corporation against directors).
"4 Veasey et al., supra note 7, at 402-03.
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statutes, these provisions perform the dual function of protecting
directors from charges of impropriety and of giving some degree
of qualified protection to the corporate interest in having decisions
made based on the entity's business purposes.'49 These provi-
sions, however, are not tailored to the indemnification problem
because they lack definitions of which directors should be
considered interested if there is a lawsuit against some or all of the
board. These provisions also do not elaborate on the whole notion
of an "interest" for the other transactions.
A general loosening of these kinds of provisions seems
appropriate within a contractarian conception of the corporation.
Indeed, one might imagine these provisions as serving as a typical
escape valve for corporate flexibility. Where statutory decision
groups are specified, one might allow a final option of any
decision-making process designed by the corporation in good faith
to balance the interests of the shareholders in honest business
decisions and the interests of the directors in prudent application of
contract principles and vindication of contract expectations.
Commentary might expand upon examples of the problems of
appearance and the possible reality of decisional groups that have
less ability to safeguard corporate interest. The tone of such
commentary would be consistent with the principles of sound
corporate governance 5 ° or the type of market-discipline striving
for sound procedures that enhance monitoring at low cost. The
contract model could be well served by an accompanying require-
ment of a corporate statement describing the rationale for the
selection of the director liability decision-making group and the
related process. The contract model would seem to be highly
149 See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-861 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-2
(Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-31 (1999). See also O'KELLEY &
THOMPSON, supra note 144, at 431 (reviewing the statutory attempts to "cleanse"
conflict of interest transactions so that they can be reviewed under the business
judgment rule).
150 See generally THE BuSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (1997) (presenting "authoritative" understanding of sound
corporate governance); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS,
REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSION-
ALISM (1996) (setting out business consensus on good board practices).
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compatible with code provisions that provide a structured basis for
innovation.'51 Indeed, the code rules suffer from a disincentive to
innovate or experiment because radical changes in heavily
regulated specifics are always resisted by any group heavily
invested in predictability of regulation.
3. Treating Indemnification Grants as Compensation
Another possibility that adds specificity to the code provisions
governing indemnification in a contract model is to place them
under a statement about compensation that is sometimes differenti-
ated from the general provisions on conflict of interest transactions.
Indemnification would be acknowledged as having a conflict of
interest component, but would be given the benefit of presumptive
regularity. Challenges to indemnification would require a special
showing to be made, such as that it is unreasonable under the
circumstances to prevent indemnification. This treatment of
indemnification would be highly consistent with the insight that
indemnification is a form of compensation. There should be no
greater nervousness about shareholder suits when the corporation
indemnifies generously than when it compensates in a similar
fashion.
Compensation statutes generally provide a special status for
decisions to grant compensation to directors, which strengthens the
qualified statutory protection for self-interested director transactions
that are approved by the board of directors after disclosure and
recusal by the affected directors. The protection that the general
conflict statutes provide to interested director transactions is
worthwhile, but far from certain in scope, where the transaction has
features that may arouse the vigilance of a court. 5 2 Thus, statutes
carve out director compensation for more liberal protection. In
effect, the indemnification statute has evolved in a parallel fashion,
but without the same conviction or clarity. Yet, the similarity in the
matter at stake is undeniable.
' But see Gordon, supra note 65, at 1569 (suggesting that code provisions
help to signal shareholders that contract provisions are acceptable).
152 O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 144, at 431.
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Both involve problematic interactions between the corporation
and its custodians. The problematic feature has been resolved
favoring optimistic adoption of contract reasoning. Challenges to
compensation and indemnification are rare. In the case of indemni-
fication, the disparity between the statute as a regulation and the
corporate reality is far greater because the statute continues to
embrace a key term of regulation while it stretches the regulatory
boundary to which the term applies. While courts continue to
embrace notions of regulatory policy limits on the enforceability of
contracts to indemnify if they ignore the requirement of superinten-
dency of conduct, 5 3 the growing reality is the irrelevance of
superintendency in connection with director reimbursement. Within
the contract model, the compensation model is perhaps the best
suited to address agency costs. To avoid inserting in the implicit
contract between shareholders and managers of corporations a
partially defective regulatory term, but still raise a flag about the
financial exoneration of directors, indemnification could be
subjected to the same (weak) restraints as compensation.
4. The Role of Corporate Counsel in a Contract Regime
None of these alternatives would tend to emphasize the role of
corporate counsel. In contrast, indemnification statutes often
identify legal counsel, selected by prescribed means, 154 as an
available mechanism to make the indemnification decision. A
choice to use corporate counsel would be possible in a deregulation
model, but indemnification would be conceived in a straightforward
way as a corporate business decision subject to the requirements of
contract commitments. Obviously, the advice of counsel might be
sought both to make contracts and to implement pre-existing
contracts. But, business judgments regarding the grant of
discretionary indemnification may need little in the way of legal
153 Waltuch v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 1996).
154 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.55(b)(3) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
855(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-55(b)(3) (1999); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-8-550(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (providing for selection of
counsel by disinterested directors or, alternatively, by the board).
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counsel to be well informed. Thus, robust contracting minimizes
legal fees.
B. Team Production as a Policy Alternative Looking Past
Contract to Discourse
The contractarian policy alternative starkly highlights the uni-
dimensional view of the corporation and its interests as assumed by
a profit maximizing model. Under that view, all that the corporate
system needs to generate is a workable system for investors to
price corporate governance terms. Absent widespread and demon-
strable failures of the market mechanisms to keep managers honest,
standard board governance is sufficient. The expressive function
that might be served by stricter limits administered by well
counseled groups charged with maintaining corporate morality has
little significance.
Even if the board should not carry appreciable financial risk for
litigation arising out of indemnification decisions, assessment and
evaluation might nonetheless remain a function properly tied to the
corporate distribution of financial exoneration to directors. If
exoneration is to be granted liberally, the award of monetary
forgiveness could be conditioned on a summing up process,
requiring self-scrutiny by the applicant and the policy councils of
the corporation. Indeed, the corporation might well benefit from a
standard diagnostic protocol that forces an open consideration of
the merits and demerits of board conduct and extracts from the
"determination" the expression of judgment associated with
managing risk for the corporation and the director. Plainly,
conceiving the corporation as transcending a mute toting up of
profits and subtraction of agency costs is an approach that has
appeal.
Federal law adopts an approach that forces discourse mediated
by outside inputs about conduct as well as imposing the risk on
directors of unreimbursed losses. 5 5 A disinterested body in
today's world has a greater role in raising the level of discourse
" See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 16, at 650-54 (describing the
securities law limitations on the indemnification of corporate directors).
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about board choices than it does in preventing improper payments.
A more important contested site in contemporary accountability
than financial outcomes, which are invariably subjected to risk-
spreading of some kind, is discursive process.
Yet, if corporate discourse is to impound a capacity for self
assessment, it should not be tied to the same framing language by
which legal liability is established or rebutted, as is the case in the
Model Act. 5 6 One could rewrite indemnification rules to function
expressly as forums for the advancement of corporate standards and
to take the forms of narrative reflections. A form that the statute
might take is that of conditioning indemnification on the appli-
cant's participation in a discursive effort at identifying the
standards of conduct that have precipitated the need for exoneration
and at assessing the claims of the various team members relating
to the correct standard to be applied and the nature of the shortfall,
if any, in the performance of a director. Such a forum would bear
some degree of resemblance to the idea of a reconciliation
approach, rather than a punitive approach, to public or political
crimes. The advantage of the approach would be to remove the
adversarial premises from the role of counsel and build up the
counseling component. The corporate lawyer as tender and
interpreter-i.e., as master narrator for corporate morality-would
be given a formal recognition."5 7 The likely result would be a
more fruitful use of the corporate lawyer's intimate knowledge of
corporate nuances, hard choices, untold stories and moral reasoning
than arises from manipulation of presumptions, contract rights and
board exposure to secondary suits for grants of indemnification.
Given its grounding in the standard legal approach of substantive
rules accompanied by protective procedures, the area of liability
and exoneration is a prototypical arena for application of corporate
counsels' skills in managing exposure to risk through indirection,
obscuring and shaping of facts and minimizing of unruly narratives.
Yet, the acknowledged aspiration of corporate law as a whole to
bond managers to the corporation is not particularly well served by
156 Kuykendall, supra note 3, at 471, 5 10-11.
157 Kostant, supra note 106. See Rock, supra note 5, at 1064 (suggesting that
Delaware corporate lawyers digest and apply stories told by the Delaware courts,
but do not tell those stories to their clients).
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process ground rules that point away from the production of robust
narratives and improved articulation of standards.
A system for assessment and evaluation in the team production
model may be designed to carry forward some of the function of
determining groups to make indemnification decisions. As a result,
aspects of the statutory scheme that might deserve retention
include: (1) formality; (2) triggering events; (3) board composition
or selection; and (4) use of corporate counsel for framing issues
and for encouraging full disclosure and transparency. 15 8 Indemni-
fication decisions may require the group charged to assess and
evaluate the indemnity afforded to a corporate director, the
questions that arise as to the wisdom of the contract provisions that
granted a right to indemnification to a particular director, the events
that created an indemnifiable legal transaction, the nature of the
counter-pressures to which the board member may have been
responding and the effect of constituent groups on the policy
process. Vigilance relating to genuine financial fraud can be ceded
to the ordinary application of contract principles, corporate
conscience and outside monitoring. Moreover, if eligibility for
indemnification is conditioned on satisfactory cooperation with the
process of self-assessment and disclosure, the true conscienceless
perpetrators of fraud are unlikely to participate. Nothing about the
process of granting indemnification requires moral absolution
because granting relief after a conclusion is reached that the
conduct and personal self-assessment of a director does not meet
corporate standards can be followed by denunciation and banish-
ment. 159 The unseemliness of indemnification on the basis of a
claim of entitlement without a mechanism that encourages
acknowledgment of wrong-doing, sharp dealing, or inattention
would be avoided if the indemnification process became an
occasion for serious institutional reflection.
158 Kostant, supra note 106.
159 Note, When Should Courts Allow the Settlement of Duty-of-Loyalty
Derivative Suits? 109 HARV. L. REv. 1084, 1097-1101 (1996) (proposing the




The complexity of director liability statutes makes them a good
window into theories of corporate law. They demonstrate features
of contract, regulation, public choice, the team production model
of the corporation and theories of law as text. They enable
contracts and fill in some gaps in contract. They place regulatory
constraints on the extent of indemnification. They divert resources
to lawyers and directors by giving lawyers a role that may do little
to alter actual payments or raise standards. The process of writing
and revising the statutes provides a focal point for lobbying on
behalf of directors. The statutes protect directors from liability
when they mediate among the demands of the team members in the
corporation. Finally, these statutes function as texts that may
primarily serve to convey symbolic meanings and to reassure
corporate readers, rather than to give commands.
In some respects, the best conclusion that can be reached about
the exoneration statutes is that they are overdetermined. They are
texts that serve multiple functions to such an extent that no one
function can be posited as the genius of the text. Rather, they
appear to be an example in legal materials of a text that is self-
referential and, therefore, is amenable to scrutiny as an artifact
instead of as a legal document that governs a set of rights and
obligations. 160 The exoneration statutes are a legal text that does
not mainly function to govern its putative subject. First, contests
over indemnification submitted to courts are rare16' and do not
occur when the corporation and the director are in agreement.
Second, in sophisticated corporations, the regime of director
exoneration is designed to minimize the bite of the regulatory
constraints by making generous use of the non-exclusivity outlet of
contract.
'60 POSNER, supra note 135, at 214-15 (describing deconstruction and
suggesting that legal texts differ from literary texts because of their differing
purposes and techniques).
161 See Cheek, supra note 16, at 270 (noting the effect of allowing directors
to grant indemnification to fellow directors).
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With the exception of a lack of clarity about the extent of
statutory provisions that make the statutes "not exclusive of other
rights" of directors to indemnification, the texts are determinate.
These statutes are not puzzling because of an elusive meaning, but
because of an elusive function. To the extent that they contain
indeterminacy, it seems to be a chosen feature of the text that
resists clarification and for which corporate readers desire, not
clarification, but the assurance that additional text will be supplied
at a time in the future. The indeterminacy imbedded in the public
policy encoded in the statutes is not a trigger for controversy over
meaning. Rather, it is a sort of reassurance to readers, one that
gives readers the opportunity as commentators to intimate good
things about the text, but avoid details. It is an indeterminacy that
shrugs off court interpretations as mainly serving to adjust the
content of the indeterminacy and to provide confidence to readers
that determinate content exists. 162 The indemnification texts
tolerate incoherence in the implicit public policy they advance
because mandatory provisions require indemnification of directors
who have committed bad acts 163 and permissive provisions are
interpreted to prohibit indemnification absent a finding of good
conduct. "6
The character of the indemnification statute renders it a
corporate liturgy. The typical indemnification code appears in many
ways to be a text that is mainly about itself, with many uses
available to which any text might be put, including the use of being
available for revision, for interpretations that primarily serve to
remind us that the text exists and for corporate readers to possess
a common text that expresses an idea that there is a forum for
norms to be safeguarded. It is a text that serves to make a claim
about its generative capacity, a source for norms to be expressed
and developed and for discourse to enrich the corporation. It is a
textual assertion of corporate normative richness that may, in fact,
displace the development of normative richness by the function of
162 See generally Waltuch v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
1996) (demonstrating reader confidence).
163 See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141-44
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
'64 Waltuch, 88 F.2d at 93-95.
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the text as the signifier of, but not the command for, such a
discourse.
Thus, the exoneration statutes are not a good match for a vision
of an emerging corporate law drenched by the premises of the
information society 65 in transparency, disclosure and discursive
pressures that help to prevent an insular corporate culture from
developing. Nonetheless, as a text, they contain the seeds of their
own transformation. They carry in them the ideal of informational
richness, disinterested inquiry and open review. They are in form
positioned to enhance expressive normativity and to serve as a
forum for the development of nuances of corporate interest in a
team production model. To do so would require a recognition that
the internal accountability function in corporations, where it is
related to financial accountability, is more figurative than real.
Contract largely governs the monetary exchanges with directors,
while the statutes aspire to force corporate narratives. The narra-
tives that are driven by tying an expressive function-i.e., the work
of determining groups-to financial liability, however, are the
narratives inspired by those under financial threat, and thus, are
protective, stingy in spirit and counter to aspirations of transparen-
cy and normative growth.
The practice of director exoneration may be refashioned by
using much of the same textual artifacts, but infusing them with
new narrative directions. A sensible trade-off might be to condition
grants of exoneration on the narratives of those asking for exonera-
tion that provide credible accounts of the circumstances that
required a request for exoneration. Thus, lawyers' skills could be
used to press for full and nuanced accounts of disputed conduct
with interpretations offered under the prism of varying conceptions
of corporate interest. Determining groups might be charged with
rendering provisional interpretations of controversial corporate
events that are in a range of reasonable disputable behavior. The
current outside limits of indemnification-i.e., no reimbursement
of payments required for forms of simple theft-could be main-
tained, in part, through standard contract norms, but the large range
of indemnifiable behavior could be taxed with a requirement of
165 Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards, supra note 143, at 437-38.
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discursive engagement produced by an adversarial framework.
Indemnification would become a good fit for a contract understand-
ing of corporations as a monetary exchange and a social reading of
them as institutional repositories. Theory would recognize a dual
voice of monetary bargain and entity narrative.
Therefore, the procedures for indemnification could become one
transmission belt for expressive norms in the efficient corporation
and for the creation of affirmative corporate narratives by those
who claim to speak the normative language of the corporate entity.
